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Matthew Ramírez

NEW MEXICO TRIBAL CANNABIS: POLICY,
POLITICS, & GUIDANCE FOR GOVERNMENT-TOGOVERNMENT COOPERATION IN STATETRIBAL CANNABIS COMPACTING
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is three-fold. First, it aims to provide
a systematic review of international, United States, state, and
federal Indian law and policy surrounding cannabis cultivation,
possession, and use in Indian Country. Second, it argues that the
2017 New Mexico tribal medical cannabis bills (SB 345 & HB
348), which were introduced in the first regular session of the
New Mexico State Legislature and would have permitted the state
to enter into intergovernmental agreements (or compacts) with
tribes who choose to implement the state’s medical cannabis
program on tribal lands, contained legal vulnerabilities likely to
hinder their effectiveness if passed into law. Third, and as a
result of this legal and political environment, this article serves
as a tribal cannabis policy resource for New Mexico legislators
and as a proposal of model legislation and compact terms for the
drafting of effective tribal medical cannabis legislation and statetribal cannabis compacts. Part I provides a historical and legal
overview of international and United States federal controlled
substances law and policy. Part II explores the issues arising in
federal Indian cannabis law and regulation, including: state
criminal jurisdiction over non-Public Law 280 tribal lands, state
taxation in Indian Country, tribal sovereign immunity, and statetribal dispute resolution. Part III covers New Mexico cannabis
law, including a discussion of the state medical cannabis
regulatory apparatus and policy analysis of the 2017 New
Mexico tribal medical cannabis bills. Part IV closely analyzes the
pros and cons of the 2017 New Mexico tribal medical cannabis
bills and provides recommendations for future effective tribal
medical cannabis legislation and compact drafting. Finally, Part
V puts forward a model tribal medical cannabis bill and statetribal cannabis compact terms reflecting the legal conclusions
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drawn herein, which may serve as constructive guidance in a
future legislative session or compact negotiations between New
Mexico and the Indian nations, tribes, and pueblos within the
state.
INTRODUCTION
From time immemorial humankind has allied with the cannabis plant
based on its ubiquitous spectrum of uses, which range from medicinal, spiritual, to
industrial.1 However, in the United States, there remains a staunch prohibition
against the cultivation, possession, and use of cannabis under international and
federal law.2 In recent decades, states have acted to legalize and regulate cannabis
for medical and recreational purposes under the authority of state law.3 This trend
led the United States government, through the Obama-era United States
Department of Justice (DOJ), to issue guidance to the U.S. Attorneys’ offices
specifying the circumstances in which conduct related to cannabis in the states
triggers a federal priority warranting enforcement of federal cannabis laws.4 In
2014, the DOJ issued further guidance tailored to cannabis law enforcement in
Indian Country, commonly referred to as the Wilkinson Memo.5 The Wilkinson
Memo recognizes that effective enforcement of cannabis law in Indian Country
requires government-to-government consultation with tribes, and except in limited

1. TERRANCE MCKENNA, FOOD OF THE GODS: THE SEARCH FOR THE ORIGINAL TREE OF
KNOWLEDGE 82–83 (1993), http://herbarium.0-700.pl/biblioteka/Food%20of%20the%20Goods.pdf;
KING CTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL: TOWARD A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 18 (2005),
http://www.kcba.org/druglaw/pdf/effectivedrugcontrol.pdf.
2. E.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
Title II, § 102, 84 Stat. 1247 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C §§ 801–959 (2012)); Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, entered into force Mar. 30, 1964, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (ratified by the United States on
May 25, 1967 with no reservations).
3. 29 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C., PROCON.ORG (last updated Dec. 28, 2016),
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (providing a list of medical
marijuana states with particulars of the laws in each state).
4. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all
U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Ogden Memo] (re: “Investigations and Prosecutions in
States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana”), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandumselected-united-state-attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states; Memorandum from James M.
Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter
Cole I] (re: “Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for
Medical Use”), http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DOJ_Guidance_on_ Medicinal_Marijuana
_1.pdf; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S.
Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole II] (re: “Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement”),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf; Memorandum from James
M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys (Feb. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Cole III] (re: “Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crime”), http://www.dfi.
wa.gov/documents/banks/dept-of-justice-memo.pdf.
5. Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all
U.S. Attorneys & Tribal Liaisons (Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Wilkinson Memo] (re: Policy Statement
Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/04/07/policy
statementregardingmarijuanaissuesinindiancountry.pdf.

Winter 2018

NEW MEXICO TRIBAL CANNABIS

77

circumstances, U.S. Attorneys should not prioritize investigation and prosecution
of alleged cannabis offenses on tribal lands.6
In 2017 and 2018, however, federal cannabis enforcement policy and
priorities shifted with the inauguration of President Donald Trump and subsequent
appointment of Jeffery Sessions as the United States Attorney General. By
establishing a DOJ taskforce to study crime reduction,7 Attorney General Sessions
established the intellectual foundation for the deconstruction of key Obama-era
smart-on-crime policies that paved the way for legal and economic stability in legal
cannabis states and Indian tribes. Sessions’ new policies include the rescinding of
Obama-era DOJ criminal-charging policies that instructed prosecutors to avoid
charging low-level offenses, like small drug offenses, to avoid harsh mandatory
minimum sentences;8 expansion of civil asset forfeiture (a policy abolished in the
Obama era);9 and rescinding the Obama-era DOJ state and tribal cannabis
enforcement guidance, which was met with bi-partisan criticism from state and
federal public officials.10 However, although presidential administrations and
policies have changed in the field of cannabis enforcement, the law has not—
leaving valid much of the Obama-era cannabis enforcement doctrine. This is true in
the current political and legal environment, where DOJ cannabis enforcement
efforts are hindered by the federal government’s inability to preempt state
controlled substances law11 and lack of funding from Congress to prosecute
cannabis crimes on a large scale.12 Additionally, because there is indication that the
cannabis enforcement strategy on the ground in the U.S. Attorneys’ offices is
unlikely to change drastically under the new Sessions’ policy,13 the Obama-era
policies still constitute the best statement of guidance to follow for states and tribes
establishing or with established cannabis programs on their lands.

6. Id. at 2 (directing U.S. Attorneys to prioritize investigation and prosecution of marijuana
conduct in Indian country to: 1) prevent distribution of marijuana to minors; 2) prevent marijuana
revenue going to criminal enterprises; 3) preventing diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal
under state law; 4) preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as pretext for illegal
drug trafficking; 5) preventing drugged driving; 6) preventing growing marijuana on public lands; 7)
preventing violence and use of firearms in state-authorized marijuana activity; and 8) preventing
marijuana use and possession on federal property).
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Announces
Crime Reduction and Public Safety Task Force (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
attorney-general-announces-crime-reduction-and-public-safety-task-force
8. Memorandum from Jeffery B. Sessions, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all Federal
Prosecutors (May 10, 2017) (re: “Department Charging and Sentencing Policy”), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download.
9. Attorney General Order No. 3946-2017, Federal Forfeiture of Property Seized by State and
Local Law Enforcement Agencies (July 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/file/982611/download.
10. Memorandum from Jeffery B. Sessions, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S.
Attorneys 1 (Jan. 4, 2018) (re: “Marijuana Enforcement”) [hereinafter Sessions Memo], https://www
.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download.
11. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
12. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 537, 115 H.R. 244 (2017).
13. Marijuana Business Daily Staff, AG Sessions rescinds Cole Memo Roiling Marijuana Industry,
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Jan. 4, 2018), https://mjbizdaily.com/report-sessions-rescind-cole-memocreating-cloud-uncertainty-marijuana-businesses/.
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Under the Obama-era DOJ policies, the National Congress of American
Indians (NCAI) took the position in 2015 that Indian tribes have the inherent right
as sovereign governments to set local laws addressing cannabis, including medical
and industrial uses according to the public health and economic needs of their
unique communities.14 And so started the trial and error process of Indian tribes’
entry into the domain of cannabis. For example, in 2015, three tribes located in
California (the Alturas Indian Rancheria, Pit River, and Pinoleville Pomo Indian
Nation tribes) had cannabis grows raided by federal agents and California county
law enforcement officers based on suspicion that the tribes were growing cannabis
on tribal lands in excess of California regulatory standards.15 Together, these raids
led to the seizure of thousands of cannabis plants.16 But where these California
tribes failed in effectively implementing cannabis programs on their lands, other
tribes have been successful—particularly through tribes’ efforts to cooperate with
the states in which their lands are located. The states of Washington and Nevada
are the leading examples. In 2015 and 2017, the Washington and Nevada state
legislatures, respectively, passed bills permitting those states to negotiate mutually
beneficial terms and enter into compacts with tribes to govern the establishment of
tribal medical and recreational cannabis enterprises on tribal lands.17 Upon the
passage of these laws, three Washington tribes: the Suquamish, Squaxin, and
Puyallup and three Nevada tribes: the Ely Shoshone, Yerington Paiute, and Las
Vegas Paiute entered into cannabis compacts with the states of Washington and
Nevada,18 and to date, the cannabis retailers created on the tribal lands in these

14. Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians Res. SD-15-047, Gen. Assemb. (2015),
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/ Resolution_exFmbjTpJKdWwCXpuSVMzbjUuBlOEwOWOVOPME
XLsxrysHoumey_SD-15-047.pdf.
15. California Tribe’s Marijuana Operation Raided in Mendocino County, CANNABIST (Sept. 23,
2015, 8:57 AM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/09/23/california-tribal-marijuana-raid-mendocinocounty/41339/; Feds Seize Marijuana from Indian Tribal Lands in California, CANNABIST (July 8,
2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/07/08/california-indian-tribes-marijuana-federalseizure/37695/.
16. See id.
17. H.B. 2000, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/201516/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2000.pdf; S.B. 375, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017), https://www.leg.
state.nv.us/Session/79th2017/Bills/SB/SB375_EN.pdf.
18. Marijuana Compact, Suquamish Tribe-Wash. (Sept. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Suquamish Cannabis
Compact], http://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/Compact-9-14-15.pdf; Marijuana Compact,
Squaxin Island Tribe-Wash. (2015) [hereinafter Squaxin Cannabis Compact], https://assets.document
cloud.org/documents/2394938/squaxin-island-draft-compact.pdf; Marijuana Compact, Puyallup TribeWash. (2015) [hereinafter Puyallup Cannabis Compact], https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents
/2699297/Puyallup-Tribal-Compact.pdf; Marijuana Compact, Ely Shoshone-Nev. (July 18, 2017), http://
marijuana.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/marijuananvgov/Content/Stay_Informed/Ely-Shoshone-CompactFully-Executed.pdf [hereinafter Ely Shoshone Cannabis Compact]; Marijuana Compact, Yerington
Paiute-Nev. (July 18, 2017), http://marijuana.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/marijuananvgov/Content/Stay_
Informed/Yerington-Paiute-Tribe-Fully-Executed(1).pdf [hereinafter Yerington Paiute Cannabis
Compact]; Marijuana Compact, Las Vegas Pauite-Nev. (July 18, 2017), http://marijuana.nv.gov/
uploadedFiles/marijuananvgov/Content/Stay_Informed/LV-Tribe-of-Paiute-Indians-Fully%20Executed.
pdf [hereinafter Las Vegas Paiute Cannabis Compact]. Note that while the Suquamish, Squaxin, Ely
Shoshone, Yerington Paiute, and Las Vegas cannabis compacts are discussed in varying levels of detail
in the discussion that follows, the Puyallup cannabis compact is not discussed further. This is because
the Puyallup compact concerns the establishment of a cannabis research laboratory on its lands, as
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states have been left alone by state and federal law enforcement and permitted to
prosper.
Meanwhile, in Santa Fe New Mexico in 2007, the New Mexico
Legislature passed an act legalizing cannabis for medical purposes and establishing
a regulatory arm of the New Mexico Department of Health (DOH) to administer
the state’s medical cannabis program.19 Since the establishment of the state medical
cannabis program, there has been an increase in the New Mexico legislative
landscape of bills introduced undertaking to either expand the scope of medical
cannabis or legalize and tax it recreationally.20 In addition, Representative Derrick
J. Lente, D-Sandia Pueblo, and Senator Benny Shendo, Jr., D-Jemez Pueblo,
introduced companion bills in the first regular session of the 2017 New Mexico
Legislature aimed at opening the door for tribes within the state to establish
medical cannabis programs on their lands.21 But while the 2017 tribal medical
cannabis bills demonstrate legislative intent to support cannabis in Indian Country,
the contents of the bills contained potentially significant legal vulnerabilities.
For example, the 2017 New Mexico tribal medical cannabis bills: a) failed
to provide for adequate representation by the state of New Mexico with the
authority to negotiate with tribes for the establishment of medical cannabis
programs on tribal lands tailored to the particular needs of individual tribes; and b)
lacked regulatory direction to tribes and DOH for the establishment of tribal
medical cannabis programs. Thus, it would have been unlikely that the bills would
have facilitated the creation of well-regulated tribal medical cannabis programs and
could have generated an environment ripe for litigation over the gaps in the
legislation. As a result, New Mexico legislators should consider alternative
approaches to tribal medical cannabis legislative drafting.
The approach to drafting New Mexico tribal medical cannabis legislation
and intergovernmental cannabis agreements proposed in this article derives from a
synthesis of the 2017 tribal medical cannabis bills, the state of Washington and
Nevada’s tribal cannabis statutes, compacts, on-point state and federal controlled
substances and Indian law, and consideration of individual instances of cannabis
law enforcement patterns. This article argues that New Mexico state legislators
should work to introduce a bill in a future session drafted around the guidance
derived from this approach, which aims to provide a blueprint for strong state-tribal

opposed to establishment of regulated medical or recreational cannabis businesses and markets as
contemplated by the Suquamish and Squaxin cannabis compacts (and as is contemplated by the New
Mexico tribal medical cannabis bills, infra note 21).
19. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2b-1 to -7 (2007).
20. E.g., S.B. 8, 53rd Leg. 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Medical Marijuana Changes); S.B. 258, 53rd
Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Decrease Marijuana Penalties); H.B. 89, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017)
(Cannabis Revenue & Freedom Act); Tom Angell, New Mexico Weighs Legal Marijuana in Special
Session, MARIJUANA.COM (Sept. 30, 2016, 10:34 AM), http://www.marijuana.com/blog/news/2016/09
/new-mexico-weighs-legal-marijuana-in-special-session/; Jason Barker, New Mexico Hopeful for Hemp
in 2017, WEEDNEWS.COM (Dec. 30, 2016, 8:15 AM), http://www.weednews.co/new-mexico-hopefulfor-hemp-in-2017/.
21. H.B. 348, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Medical Marijuana Tribal Agreements),
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/17%20Regular/bills/house/HB0348.pdf; S.B. 345, 53rd Leg. 1st
Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Medical Marijuana Tribal Agreements), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/17%20
Regular/bills/senate/SB0345.pdf.
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cooperative relationships in the domain of medical cannabis. The article concludes
by proposing model tribal medical cannabis legislation and medical cannabis
compact terms that could serve as the foundation for a future statute and state-tribal
cannabis compacts in New Mexico.
I. Federal Cannabis Law: Controlled Substances Act & Cannabis Policy
To understand where Indian tribes—and in particular the tribes, Nations,
and Pueblos of New Mexico—stand in the maze of cannabis business, law, and
policy takes appeal to the colored history, law, politics, and cultural influence of
the cannabis plant in the United States. Accordingly, what follows in Part I is a
discussion of the features of international and United States federal cannabis law.
A. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, &
the United States Controlled Substances Act
The roots of the United States government’s prohibition on cannabis are
traceable to the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.22 The act provided that “every person
who imports, manufactures, produces, compounds, sells, deals in, dispenses,
administers, or gives away marihuana” shall be subject to a special federal tax once
per year.23 The amount a person was taxed under the act was determined by the
nature of their involvement with the plant.24 For example, importers, manufactures,
and compounders of cannabis were taxed $24 per year, while researchers were only
taxed $1 per year.25 Additionally, all persons who were subject to the tax, upon
their first payment, were required to register their names and places of business
“with the [Internal Revenue] collector of the district.”26 And despite the American
Medical Association coming out against the bill, the Marihuana Tax Act passed,
constituting a significant step in the evolution of the federal government’s authority
to regulate and police “drugs” with plenary authority.27
The next step in the federal government’s prohibition of cannabis came in
the form of its ratification of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Single

22. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551, 551 (imposing “excise tax upon certain dealers of
marihuana, to impose transfer tax upon certain dealings of marihuana, and to safeguard the revenue
therefrom by registry and recording”). For a thorough discussion of the legal history of drug regulation
and prohibition by the United States federal government, see KING CTY. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at
26–39.
23. § 2(a), 50 Stat. at 551–52.
24. Id. § 2(a)(1)–(5).
25. Id. § 2(a)(1), (4).
26. Id. § 1(d), 2(e).
27. KING CTY. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 34; see also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 26
(1969) (holding Marihuana Tax Act unconstitutional on grounds that Petitioner Timothy Leary’s
privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because, at the time Leary “acquired marihuana[,]
he was confronted with a statute which on its face permitted him to acquire the drug legally, provided he
pay $100 per ounce transfer tax and gave incriminating information, and simultaneously within a system
of regulations which, according to the Government, prohibited him from acquiring marihuana under any
conditions”).
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Convention) on May 25, 1967. The Single Convention, as subsequently amended,28
placed tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC,” i.e., the psychoactive compound in the
cannabis plant) in Schedule I,29 subjecting the chemical to the strictest class of
regulation. In effect, as a plant containing a Schedule I drug under the Single
Convention, the United States (as a signatory to the convention) was required to
enact domestic policy attaching criminal liability to the possession of cannabis.30
Three years later, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act—commonly referred to as the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA).31 The CSA entered into force under the Richard Nixon administration
and in the midst of its “War on Drugs”—the administration’s thinly veiled attack
on the counter-culture protesters of the era and racial minorities.32 The CSA
provides that it was the intent of Congress that the Act bring the federal
government into compliance with its obligations under the international drug
control conventions.33 Congress also recognized in enacting the CSA that although
some drugs listed as controlled substances under CSA are useful and legitimate,
illegal use has a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare
of the American people.34
Generally, by rule, the United States Attorney General may schedule or
remove from a particular schedule controlled substances under the act.35 Five
schedules for substances are created under the CSA, ranging from Schedule I,
under which a substance is deemed to have a “high potential for abuse,” “no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and “a lack of
28. See generally Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 2; Convention on Psychotropic
Substances arts. 7, 33, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (1971); Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/13 (collectively “the International
Drug Control Conventions”), https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_
Conventions/Ebook/The_International_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf (amending the 1961 Single
Convention).
29. UNITED NATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL CONVENTIONS: SCHEDULES OF THE
CONVENTION ON PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES OF 1971 AS AT 25 SEPTEMBER 2013 2 (2013), https://
www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_Conventions/1971_Schedules/STCND-1-Add2_E.pdf.
30. See Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 2, at arts. 4(a), 28(3), 33, 36.
31. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II,
§ 102, 84 Stat. 1247 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C §§ 801–959 (2012)). See generally CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., HV-5801-A, COMPREHENSIVE DRUG ABUSE AND PREVENTION AND CONTROL ACT:
SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS (1971) (summarizing and interpreting the major pieces of the CSA,
reflecting an early legislative intent for the act); see also Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A
Chronology, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last modified 2014)
(featuring a timeline created for investigative series Frontline: Drug Wars and providing a history of the
war on drugs spanning the last 30 years, focusing a majority of attention on the war against Colombian
and Mexican drug cartels); Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to
Crime, ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-ondrugs-how-president-nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319/ (discussing the war on drugs and
specifically how President Nixon tied the politics of addiction to crime to implement the CSA and
commence the war on drugs).
32. KING CTY. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 37.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 801a (2012).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 801(1)–(2) (2012).
35. 21 U.S.C § 811(a)–(c) (2012).
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accepted safety for use . . . under medical supervision,” to Schedule V, under which
a substance is deemed to have “a low potential for abuse,” “a currently accepted
medical use,” and that “may lead to limited physical dependence or psychological
dependence.”36 Like its placement in the Single Convention, THC is a Schedule I
substance under the CSA.37 As a result, the sale, purchase, and possession of THC
or the cannabis plant is unlawful and subject to criminal punishment.38
Although it is well recognized as a point of constitutional law that the
CSA provisions criminalizing the cultivation, sale, and possession of cannabis do
not exceed Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce,39 the CSA neither
preempts nor forecloses states’ promulgation of state laws governing controlled
substances in their territories.40
Through the Marihuana Tax Act, ratification of the Single Convention,
and enactment of the CSA—and as a result of the harsh penalties and mass
incarceration of non-violent drug offenders that has followed therefrom—the
federal government has attempted to rid the general population of cannabis and
cannabis users.41 However, in an exercise of state rights, individual states remain
free to reject the CSA and enact their own controlled substances and cannabis laws
(even if those laws are inconsistent with the CSA). Accordingly, this Part turns to
outlining how the CSA is structured to operate in states that have legalized medical
or recreational cannabis.

36. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)–(b) (2012).
37. Id. at § 812 Schedule (c)(17).
38. Penalties for Simple Possession, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012); but see Complaint at 2–3, Washington
v. Sessions, No. 1:17-cv-05625 (S.D.N.Y. filed July, 24, 2017) (arguing that the CSA has wrongfully
and unconstitutionally criminalized cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of cannabis and
seeking a declaration that the CSA as it pertains to the classification of cannabis as a Schedule I drug
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, protections guaranteed by the First
Amendment, and the fundamental Right to Travel), https://mjbizdaily.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
ECF-Version-of-Complaint.pdf.
39. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005); id. at 27 n.37 (citations omitted) (“We acknowledge
that evidence proffered by respondents in this case regarding the effective medical uses for marijuana, if
found credible after trial, would cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require marijuana
to be listed in Schedule I. But the possibility that the drug may be reclassified in the future has no
relevance to the question whether Congress now has the power to regulate its production and
distribution. Respondents’ submission, if accepted, would place all homegrown medical substances
beyond the reach of Congress’ regulatory jurisdiction.”).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (providing “[n]o provision of this subchapter shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates,
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision
of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together”); Ledcke v.
State, 260 Ind. 382, 393, 296 N.E.2d 412, 419–20 (1973); State v. McHorse, 1973-NMCA-144, ¶¶ 16–
21, 85 N.M. 753, 517 P.2d 75.
41. See generally Kristen Gwynne, 10 Of The Harshest Sentences For Pot In The U.S., ALTERNET
(Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.alternet.org/drugs/10-harshest-sentences-pot-us; Marijuana Arrests &
Punishments, ACLU.ORG (last visited Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/other/marijuana-arrestspunishments; Eric Schlosser, Marijuana And The Law, ATLANTIC (Sept. 1994),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/09/marijuana-and-the-law/308958/; Eric Schlosser,
Reefer Madness, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1994), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/08/reefermadness/303476/.
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B. DOJ Cannabis Policy & Legislation Concerning Cannabis in the States
Modern federal CSA enforcement strategy relating to cannabis is
memorialized in Obama-era DOJ policies that took a populist and anti-war on
drugs approach to controlled substances policing in the states. On October 19,
2009, Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden, circulated a memorandum (the
“Ogden Memo”) providing “guidance to federal prosecutors in States that have
enacted laws authorizing the medical use of marijuana.”42 The Ogden Memo
established that the DOJ remains committed to enforcement of the CSA in the
states43 and recognizes that as a matter of policy “Congress has determined that
marijuana is a dangerous drug, and the illegal distribution and sale of marijuana is a
serious crime and provides a significant source of revenue to large-scale criminal
enterprises, gangs, and cartels.”44 The Ogden Memo added that the DOJ was
committed to “making efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and
prosecutorial resources”45 and that federal prosecutors were still delegated “the
broadest discretion” in choosing whether to prosecute a given case.46
The Ogden Memo also directed that federal policy in the wake of state
medical marijuana still called for the investigation and prosecution of “significant
traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana,” the disruption of cannabis
cultivation and trafficking networks, and pursuit of cases against commercial
enterprises “that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit.”47 However, the
Ogden Memo provided that federal resources generally should not be focused on
prosecuting cases involving individuals “whose actions are in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of
marijuana.”48 For example, prosecutorial discretion should not be exercised in the
case of an individual with a serious illness who uses the substance as a part of a
recommended regimen of treatment consistent with state law; this logic extended to
caregivers who grow marijuana for the limited purposes of supplying medical
marijuana patients.49
Based on this policy position, the Ogden Memo lays out a list of seven
factors, which if present in a case, indicate marijuana conduct is not in
“unambiguous compliance with applicable state law and may indicate illegal drug
trafficking” that triggers federal interest: “1) unlawful possession of use of
firearms; 2) violence; 3) sale to minors; 4) financial and marketing activities with
the terms, conditions, or purposes of state law, including evidence of money
laundering activity and/or financial gains or excessive amounts of cash inconsistent
with purported compliance with state or local law; 5) amounts of cannabis

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Ogden Memo, supra note 4, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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inconsistent with purported compliance with state or local law; 6) illegal possession
or sale of other controlled substances; or 7) ties to other criminal enterprises.”50
The Ogden Memo recognized that its list of factors was not intended to be
exhaustive of circumstances in which federal enforcement is warranted.51
Additionally, the Ogden Memo established that prosecution under the CSA places
no obligations on federal prosecutors to “charge, prove, or otherwise establish any
state law violations.”52 The memorandum stated that it did not confer any new
rights on individuals enforceable in any adjudicatory matter; nor did it foreclose
federal prosecution of cases involving marijuana where there is clear and
unambiguous compliance with state medical marijuana laws and an absence of one
or all of the seven factors in a given case.53 The memorandum concluded by
directing that all United States Attorneys’ offices should continue to review
marijuana cases for potential prosecution on a case-by-case basis.54
On the same day that the Ogden Memo was released, the New York Times
ran a story calling the document “hardly an enthusiastic embrace of medical
marijuana . . . , but signaled clearly that the [Obama] administration thought there
were more important priorities for [federal] prosecutors”55 than prosecuting
medical marijuana patients. However, confusion concerning the contours of the
federal policy remained in medical cannabis states, and in some extreme cases
resulted in the federal prosecution of medical cannabis patients and caregivers
whose cannabis grows were determined to have reached a size triggering federal
interest pursuant to the Ogden factors.56 Based on the continued confusion
regarding the status of federal medical cannabis regulation, on June 29, 2011,
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued the first in a trilogy of memoranda
that defined the DOJ’s stance on medical and recreational cannabis in the states for
the remainder of the Obama administration.57
Deputy Attorney General Cole’s June 2011 memo (Cole I) was issued
based on a request for a legal opinion from Paula T. Dow, the Attorney General for
the State of New Jersey, concerning the DOJ’s position on New Jersey’s medical
marijuana law.58 The purpose of Cole I, according to James Cole in a 2016
interview with a reporter from Marijuana Business Daily, was to “remedy” the
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 3.
55. David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. Won’t Prosecute in States that Allow Medical Marijuana,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/us/20cannabis.html.
56. See, e.g., Rob Reuteman, The Confused State of Pot Law Enforcement, CNBC (Apr. 20, 2010),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36179498 (reporting on a Colorado medical marijuana caregiver licensed to
grow 72 marijuana plants who was discovered to be growing 224 plants by federal agents after
appearing on local television boasting of the size of his grow and subsequently arrested and charged
with federal marijuana crimes).
57. Cole I, supra note 4; Cole II, supra note 4; Cole III, supra note 4.
58. Letter from Paul J. Fishman, N.J. United States Attorney, to Paula T. Dow, Attorney General
for the State of New Jersey (June 30, 2011) (re: “New Jersey Compassionate Use of Medical Marijuana
Act”—cover letter to Cole I), http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DOJ_Guidance_on_
Medicinal_Marijuana_1.pdf.
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“over-reading [of] the Ogden Memo.”59 “The Ogden Memo,” Cole stated, “was
really intended to say people who are really sick, and people who give them care in
that illness” are not going to be subject to marijuana prosecution efforts.60 But it
was not intended, said Cole, to imply that anyone involved with marijuana who is
in compliance with state law would be left alone by the feds.61 Cole I reiterated the
Ogden Memo’s policy of balancing the duty to prosecute large-scale criminal
marijuana enterprises under the CSA with prosecutorial efficiency.62 However, the
memorandum noted that since the Ogden Memo there had been “an increase in the
scope of commercial cultivation, sale, distribution and use of marijuana for
purported medical purposes.”63 “Persons who are in the business of cultivating,
selling or distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly facilitate such
activities” according to Cole I, “are in violation” of the CSA; state and local laws
or ordinances are no defense.64 Moreover, Cole I advised that those engaging in
“transactions involving the proceeds of such activity may also be in violation of the
federal money laundering statute and other federal financial law.”65
On August 29, 2013, Deputy Attorney General Cole issued his second
memorandum (Cole II) to the U.S. Attorneys’ offices concerning marijuana
enforcement in the states in reaction to the 2012 passage of a statute and
constitutional initiative in the states of Washington and Colorado legalizing
recreational cannabis.66 In its research, the DOJ concluded that the federal
government could not preempt state laws legalizing cannabis by authority of the
CSA,67 but that it could likely “stop the regulatory scheme[s of the states] because
it could probably stop conduct that’s illegal under federal law.”68 According to
Cole, the purpose of Cole II was to send a message to the states that “you guys
have to become serious about your regulatory enforcement.” Cole II provides that
the DOJ has historically not devoted resources to prosecuting individuals whose
conduct is limited to possession of small amounts of cannabis for personal use on
private property, leaving such enforcement for state and local authorities.69 It also
stood for the proposition that the size or commercial nature of a cannabis operation
alone should not constitute a proxy for determining whether such an operation
triggers a federal priority.70 However, this federal position on state cannabis
industries rested on an expectation that states and localities implement “strong and
59. John Schroyer, Famous Marijuana Memos: Q&A with Former Deputy Attorney General James
Cole, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (July 27, 2016) http://mjbizdaily.com/the-famous-marijuana-memos-qawith-former-doj-deputy-attorney-general-james-cole/.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Cole I, supra note 4, at 1.
63. Id. at 2 (noting that, in the last year, several jurisdictions considered or enacted legislation
authorizing multiple large-scale, privately-operated industrial cannabis grows with revenue projections
in the millions of dollars).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Cole II, supra note 4.
67. Schroyer, supra note 59; see also 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
68. Schroyer, supra note 59.
69. Cole II, supra note 4, at 2.
70. Id. at 3.
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effective regulatory and enforcement systems” addressing the threats posed by
cannabis legalization in the realm of “public safety, public health, and other law
enforcement interests.”71 In furtherance of its policy position and expectations of
the states, Cole II established that the federal government’s updated cannabis law
enforcement priorities (Cole II Priorities) were as follows:
• Preventing the distribution of cannabis to minors
• Preventing revenue from the sale of cannabis from going to criminal
enterprises, gangs, and cartels
• Preventing the diversion of cannabis from the states where it is legal under
state law in some form to other states
• Preventing state-authorized cannabis activity from being used as a cover or
pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity
• Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution
of cannabis
• Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public
health consequences associated with cannabis use
• Preventing the growing of cannabis on public lands and the attendant public
safety and environmental dangers posed by cannabis production on public
lands
• Preventing cannabis possession or use on federal property72
Finally, on February 14, 2014, Deputy Attorney General Cole released the
third DOJ cannabis policy memorandum, the subject of which was “Guidance
Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes” (Cole III).73 Cole’s purpose for the
memorandum was to send a message to banks to “go ahead” and provide services
to cannabis industry clients.74 Cole III stands for the proposition that in determining
whether to enforce federal money laundering and financial crimes statutes,75 it
should consider whether financial conduct implicates the Cole II Priorities.76
Since 2015, Congress has embraced the Cole Trilogy, approving budgets
providing that federal appropriations cannot be used to enforce federal cannabis

71. Id.
72. Id. 1–2.
73. Cole III, supra note 4. See generally Janel Greiman & Stephanie E. Slaughter, Marijuana, State
Taxation, and the Risks to Practitioners Serving the Pot Culture, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES
(Aug. 2014) (discussing a brief history of marijuana law, states’ legalization, guidance for tax
professionals, individual tax payers, business taxpayers, the federal view, and the hemp market); WeiChih Chiang, Obstacles to Legalizing Marijuana: Resolving the Federal-State Conflict, 94 PRAC. TAX
STRATEGIES 219 (2015) (discussing several areas of tax law that affect medical and recreational
marijuana industry, including: tax exempt status, medical expense deductions, illegal income, costs of
sold goods, business expenses, forfeitures, self-employment tax, and estate tax).
74. Schroyer, supra note 59.
75. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012) (money laundering); 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012) (unlicensed money
transmitter); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012) (non-reporting of transactions involving the proceeds of
marijuana-related violations).
76. Cole III, supra note 4, at 2.

Winter 2018

NEW MEXICO TRIBAL CANNABIS

87

prohibition in states that have legalized it.77 These budgets have also operated to
prevent the DOJ and United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) from using
appropriated funds to prosecute institutions of higher education and state
departments of agriculture that have been authorized to grow hemp for research or
establish agricultural pilot programs under the Legitimacy of Industrial Hemp
Research Section of the Agricultural Act of 2014.78 A bill was also introduced in
February, 2017, in the House of Representatives by Dana Rohrbacher, DCalifornia, seeking to protect individuals in legal cannabis states from the threat of
federal enforcement79 by amending the CSA to not apply to any person acting in
compliance with state cannabis laws.80 However, there has been no action on the
bill since its introduction and referral to the House Subcommittee on Health.81
Transitioning into 2018, 29 states and Washington DC have legalized either
medical or recreational marijuana.82
77. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538,
128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2015); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129
Stat. 2242, 2333 (2016); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 537, 115 H.R.
244 (2017); see also United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1136, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2016) (Section 542 of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 prohibits the federal government only from preventing the
implementation of the “specific rules of state law authorizing the use, possession, or cultivation of
medical” cannabis and does not prohibit prosecution of individuals who use, possess, or cultivate
cannabis in a manner unauthorized by state law. And individuals are entitled to evidentiary hearings to
determine whether their use, possession, or cultivation of cannabis was in compliance with state law
prior to federal prosecution). However, it should be noted that the official statement released by
President Trump accompanying his signing of H.R. 244 stated that the President intends to “treat” the
provision of the budget providing that DOJ may not use appropriated funds to prevent the
implementation of state medical cannabis programs “consistently with my constitutional responsibility
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Statement by President Donald Trump on Signing H.R. 244 into Law (May 5, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/05/statement-president-donald-j-trump-signinghr-244-law. And thereafter, the Washington Post reported that DOJ spokesperson Ian Prior stated: “[t]he
Department of Justice must be in a position to use all laws available to combat the transnational drug
organizations and dangerous drug traffickers who threaten American lives.” John Wagner & Matt
Zapotosky, Jeff Sessions’ War on Drugs Has Medical Marijuana Advocates Worried, WASH. POST
(May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/jeff-sessions-war-on-drugs-has-medicalmarijuana-advocates-worried/2017/05/12/0c0043ee-3738-11e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_
story.html?utm_term=.a95b99b965f9.
78. Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act of 2015 § 539; Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2016 § 763; Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 § 538; see also Legitimacy of Industrial Hemp
Research, 7 U.S.C. § 5940 (2012).
79. H.R. 975, 115 Cong. 2017–2018 (Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2017 introduced on
Feb. 7, 2017 by Rep. Dana Rohrbacher (R-CA-48) assigned to House Judiciary, Energy & Commerce,
and Health Committees); Daniel M. Jimenez, House Bill Seeks to Protect Individuals in Legal
Marijuana
States
from
Feds,
CANNABIST
(Feb.
10,
2017,
1:10
PM),
http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/02/10/state-marijuana-laws-individuals-protection/73471/.
80. 163 CONG. REC. H1075 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2017) (statement of Rep. Rohrbacher), https://www
.congress.gov/crec/2017/02/07/CREC-2017-02-07-pt1-PgH1075.pdf.
81. See H.R. 975, Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2017 under Actions tab, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/975/actions (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).
82. 29 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C., PROCON.ORG (last updated June 26, 2017, 12:53
PM), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (listing medical
marijuana states with details of the laws in each state); see also Benjamin Groggin, Weed is Legal in
Eight States. Here’s What You Need to Know Before Lighting Up, DIGG (Nov. 20, 2016),
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Notwithstanding, the Trump administration’s DOJ—led by Attorney
General Jeffery Sessions—was bound by neither the Ogden Memo nor the Cole
Trilogy, and since coming into power, has shifted the focus of cannabis
enforcement away from the Cole II Priorities, signaling “a return to outdated drugwar policies[.]”83 These policies, however, have flown in the face of the early
indications by then-candidate Donald Trump that his administration would
continue the Obama era’s populist and states’ rights approach to cannabis law
enforcement. In fact, in 2015, candidate Trump stated on the campaign trial that
“[i]n terms of marijuana and legalization, I think that should be a state issue, stateby-state. . . . Marijuana is such a big thing. I think medical should happen—right?
Don’t we agree? I think so. And then I really believe we should leave it up to the
states.”84 In contrast, however, Attorney General Sessions is on the record stating
that “good people don’t smoke marijuana,” that he is “definitely not a fan of
expanded use of marijuana,” and that he will support the DOJ adopting
“responsible polices” for enforcement of the CSA.85
In step with the early Trump-Sessions political positions quoted above,
common sense counseled that the Trump-Sessions effect on state and tribal
cannabis was likely to manifest in one of five general scenarios: 1) Sessions, with
Trump’s blessing, takes the “nuclear option and wages war” against both
recreational and medical cannabis; 2) medical cannabis is left in place, but
recreational use is terminated; 3) existing cannabis markets are left alone, but new
states or tribes are delayed or blocked; 4) status quo—no change in position; or 5)
Trump comes out in support of cannabis and the cannabis industry.86And with the
first year of Sessions DOJ policy as the chief indicator of the future of federal
cannabis policy, there is strong indication that Attorney General Sessions’ is opting
for the “nuclear option,”87 despite his acknowledgment that the policies embodied
in the Cole Trilogy are largely “valid.”88

http://digg.com/2016/legal-marijuana-law-guide (listing recreational marijuana states with particulars of
laws in each state).
83. Marijuana Business Daily Staff, supra note 13.
84. Jenna Johnson, Trump Softens Position on Marijuana Legalization, WASH. POST (Oct. 29,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/10/29/trump-wants-marijuanalegalization-decided-at-the-state-level/?utm_term=.8a1e22d0c791.
85. Matt Laslo, Donald Trump’s Cabinet Picks Could Be a Bummer for Legal Weed in 2017,
DAILY BEAST (Dec. 26, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/12/27/donald-trump-scabinet-picks-could-be-a-bummer-for-legal-weed-in-2017.html(quoting Jeff Sessions stating “good
people don’t smoke marijuana”). See generally Cannabist Staff, Federal Marijuana Playbook: Trump
Administration’s Tough Talk and What We Know So Far, CANNABIST (Mar. 23, 2017, 6:12 PM),
http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/03/23/federal-marijuana-trump-administration-tough-talk-jeffsessions/76000/(providing timeline of major federal cannabis policy statements since Trump took
office).
86. Debra Borchardt, 5 Ways Trump Could Affect The Marijuana Industry, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2017),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/01/20/5-ways-trump-could-affect-the-marijuanaindustry/#173fc0d95416; see also Sean Spicer Says Federal Crackdown on Recreational Marijuana is
Coming Soon, YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5FzP41FXlk (clip from
February 23, 2017 White House Briefing by White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer, discussing
Trump’s position on medical and recreational cannabis policy).
87. Letter from Jeffery Session, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mitch McConnell,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Charles Schumer,
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Sessions took the first step in rooting his ideology in the DOJ and
renewing the war on drugs89 on February 27, 2017, where the Attorney General
established a DOJ “Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety” (Task
Force).90 The Task Force reportedly included the directors of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
the United States Marshals Service; and Administrator of the DEA.91 In a DOJ
memorandum providing updates on the Task Force to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices,
Sessions wrote that the Task Force had been commissioned to identify ways in
which the federal government can more effectively fight “illegal immigration and
violent crime . . . , drug trafficking, and gang violence.”92 The Task Force is
structured to function through a group of subcommittees that have been
commissioned to review, among other matters, “existing policies in the areas of
charging, sentencing, and marijuana to ensure consistency with the Department’s
overall strategy on reducing violent crime and with Administration goals and

Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, & Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives (May 1,
2017),
https://www.scribd.com/document/351079834/Sessions-Asks-Congress-To-Undo-MedicalMarijuana-Protections (“I write to renew the Department of Justice’s opposition to the inclusion of
language in any appropriation legislation[, chiefly Section 542 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2016,] that would prohibit the use of Department of Justice funds or in any way inhibit its authority to
enforce the Controlled Substances Act. . . . I believe it would be unwise for Congress to restrict the
discretion of the Department to fund particular prosecutions, particularly in the midst of an historic drug
epidemic and potentially long-term uptick in violent crime. The Department must be in a position to use
all laws available to combat the transnational drug organizations and dangerous drug traffickers who
threaten American lives.”); see supra note 77 (2015–2017 federal budget legislation); see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks
on Efforts to Combat Crime and Restore Public Safety Before Federal, State and Local Law
Enforcement (Mar. 15, 2017) ([W]e need to focus on . . . fight[ing] drug use: preventing people from
ever taking drugs in the first place. . . . I realize this may be an unfashionable belief in a time of growing
tolerance of drug use. But too many lives are at stake to worry about being fashionable. I reject the idea
that America will be a better place if marijuana is sold in every corner store. . . . Our nation needs to say
clearly once again that using drugs will destroy your life.”), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech
/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-efforts-combat-violent-crime-and-restore.
88. Jeff Sessions Confirms Validity of “Cole Memo” Respecting States On Marijuana Legalization,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X-EvCFJUj2A; Tom Angell, Sessions
Says Obama Marijuana Memo is ‘Valid’, MASS ROOTS (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.massroots.com/
news/sessions-says-obama-marijuana-memo-is-valid.
89. Carter Sherman, Sessions Might Bring Back the War on Drugs With Harsher Sentences for
Low-Level Offenders, VICE NEWS (May 9, 2017), https://news.vice.com/story/jeff-sessions-might-bringback-the-war-on-drugs-with-harsher-sentences-for-low-level-offenders; Sari Horwitz, How Sessions
Wants to Bring Back the War on Drugs, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/how-jeff-sessions-wants-to-bring-back-the-war-on-drugs/2017/04/08/
414ce6be-132b-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.c90a384aa94b; C.K., Drug War
Policies: Jeff Session Orders Tougher Drug Crime Charges, ECONOMIST (May 12, 2017), http://www
.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/05/drug-war-policies.
90. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 7.
91. Pema Levy, Sessions Claims A Mysterious Task Force Is Behind His Most Controversial
Reforms, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 2, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2017
/08/sessions-claims-a-mysterious-task-force-is-behind-his-most-controversial-reforms/.
92. Memorandum from Jeffery B. Sessions, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Head of
Department Components U.S. Attorneys 1 (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/955476/download (re: “Update on the Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety”).
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priorities.”93 The memo concludes by requesting the Task Force to provide
Sessions with its first policy recommendations by July 27, 2017.94
As July 27, 2017 came and went, the substance of the Task Force’s
recommendations to Attorney General Sessions remained secret and the DOJ
subsequently declined to release the Task Force’s findings to the public.95 The
Associated Press (AP), however, intercepted in early August, 2017, portions of the
Task Force’s recommendations concerning CSA enforcement and cannabis.96 The
AP reported that the Task Force’s conclusions generally reiterated the Cole
doctrine of cannabis enforcement strategy, but urged DOJ to continue to study
whether to change or rescind the Cole Trilogy.97 The AP noted two other salient
points in the Task Force’s recommendations. First, federal officials should continue
to oppose legislation blocking the DOJ from interfering with medical cannabis in
states where it is allowed.98 And second, the DOJ should collaborate with
Department of Treasury officials to offer guidance to financial institutions
concerning implementation of robust anti-money laundering programs to combat
illegal transactions where cannabis is legal.99
Despite the lack of transparency on the part of the DOJ, the Task Force’s
position on CSA enforcement strategy outlined by the AP appears congruent with
Attorney General Sessions’ recent response to the Governors of Alaska,
Washington, Colorado, and Oregon’s joint letter calling for state-federal
cooperation in regulating legal cannabis in their states.100 The Governors’ letter
requests that the Trump administration “engage with us before embarking on any
changes to [cannabis] regulatory and enforcement systems” because Cole doctrine
“has been indispensable—providing the necessary framework for state regulatory
programs centered on public safety and health protections.”101 The Governors

93. Id.
94. Id.; but see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement by Attorney
General Jeff Sessions on Recommendations from the Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety
(July 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-jeff-sessions-recommend
ations-task-force-crime-reduction-and (disclosing that the Task Force has been providing Attorney
General Sessions with “recommendations on a rolling basis”).
95. Levy, supra note 91; see also Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator, State of Oregon, to Jeffery
B. Sessions, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.wyden.senate.
gov/download/?id=4EA1FB77-9E23-4CFD-AD92-BE2F2E830F27&download=1 (requesting that
Attorney General Sessions immediately make public the recommendations of the Task Force, including
those related to cannabis).
96. Sadie Gurman, Huff, Puff, Pass? AG’s Pot Fury Not Echoed By Task Force, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 5, 2017), https://apnews.com/ad37624fcb8e485a8d57a013d48a227c.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Letter from Jeffery B. Sessions III, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Jay Inslee,
Governor, State of Washington & Robert Ferguson, Attorney General, Office of the Att’y Gen. 1–2
(July 24, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/LtrfromSessions.pdf; Letter
from Bill Walker, Governor, State of Alaska, John Hickenlooper, Governor, State of Colorado, Kate
Brown, Governor, State of Oregon, & Jay Inslee, Governor, State of Washington to Jeffery B. Sessions,
Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Steve Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 1–2
(Apr. 3, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/LtrfromSessions.pdf.
101. Walker, Hickenlooper, Brown, & Inslee, supra note 100, at 1.
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conclude by expressing continued commitment “to implementing the will of our
citizens” and working with their legislatures to put in place “robust [cannabis]
regulatory structures” that prioritize public health and safety, reduction of
inequitable incarceration, and economic expansion.102
Attorney General Sessions responded to the Governor of the state of
Washington by quoting the language from Cole II under which the DOJ expresses
the primacy of its authority to investigate and prosecute cannabis crimes under the
CSA, even where a Cole II Priority is not triggered, but an important federal
interest is implicated.103 Sessions also cited a study conducted by the Northwest
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) concluding cannabis activity in the
State of Washington was under-regulated and lacked adequate oversight.104
Sessions concluded that in order to engage in productive dialogue on the issue of
cannabis legalization, Washington should advise the DOJ of: 1) its plan to address
the problems raised in the HIDTA report; and 2) its “efforts to ensure that all
marijuana activity is compliant with state marijuana laws” and the Cole II
Priorities.105
The Attorney General’s new war on drugs gained further traction when
Sessions overturned key Obama-era criminal law enforcement policies implicating
cannabis users and growers. On May 10, 2017, Sessions rescinded his predecessor,
Eric Holder’s criminal-charging policies that instructed DOJ prosecutors to avoid
charging low-level offenses, like small drug offenses, which would trigger harsh
mandatory minimum sentences.106 Sessions’ new policy requires prosecutors to
charge defendants with the most serious and readily provable offense.107 Sessions
also issued an order expanding the use of asset forfeiture, a policy abolished in the
Obama era that gives law enforcement broad authority to permanently seize money

102. Id.
103. Sessions, supra note 100, at 1; Cole II, supra note 4, at 3–4.
104. Sessions, supra note 100, at 1–2; NW. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA,
WASHINGTON STATE MARIJUANA IMPACT REPORT 14 (2016), http://www.riag.ri.gov/documents/
NWHIDTAMarijuanaImpactReportVolume1.pdf.
105. Sessions, supra note 92, at 2.
106. Compare Memorandum from Jeffery B. Sessions, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
all Federal Prosecutors (May 10, 2017) (re: “Department Charging and Sentencing Policy”),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download, with Memorandum from Eric H.
Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), (re:
“Department Policy on Charging and Sentencing”), https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/criminal_
defense_topics/essential_topics/sentencing_resources/clemency/holdermemo.pdf; Memorandum from
Eric H. Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Attorneys and Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Div. (Aug. 12, 2010), (re: “Department Policy on Charging Mandatory
Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases”), https://www.fd.org/sites/
default/files/criminal_defense_topics/essential_topics/sentencing_resources/useful_reports/august-122013-holder-memo-on-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences.pdf; Memorandum from Eric H.
Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Dep’t of Justice Attorneys (Sept. 24, 2014) (re:
“Guidance regarding § 851 Enhancements In Plea Negotiations”), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/ag_guidance_on_section_851_enhancements_in_plea_negotiations/download [collectively, the
“Holder Memos”].
107. Sessions, supra note 106.
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and property from individuals, even if they have not been charged with a crime.108
“[A]sset forfeiture,” stated Sessions in a press release accompanying the new
policy, “is a key tool that helps law enforcement defund organized crime, take back
ill-gotten gains, and prevent new crimes from being committed, and it weakens the
criminals and cartels.”109
Finally, on January 4, 2018 in memorandum titled “Marijuana
Enforcement” (the “Sessions Memo”),110 Attorney General Sessions announced a
“return to the rule of law” in cannabis enforcement in a society where the Obamaera policies had undermined local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement
partners’ ability to enforce the laws of the United States.111 The Sessions Memo
begins by observing that Congress, through the CSA, has determined “that
marijuana is a dangerous drug and that marijuana activity is a serious crime.”112 It
directs that “[i]n deciding which marijuana activities to prosecute under these laws
with the Department’s finite resources should follow the well-established principles
that govern all federal prosecutions. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti originally
set forth these principles in 1980, and they have been refined over time, as reflected
in chapter 9-27.000 of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.” As a result, federal
prosecutors in deciding which cases to prosecute must “weigh all relevant
considerations” with focus directed at the following factors:
• The seriousness of the crime
• The deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions
• The cumulative impact of the particular crimes on the community113
Based on this guidance, the Sessions Memo concludes that all “previous
nationwide guidance specific to marijuana enforcement is unnecessary and is
rescinded[, i.e., the Ogden Memo, Cole Trilogy, and Wilkinson Memo (addressed
further in Part II(A))], effective immediately.”114
The issuance of the Sessions Memo was met by bi-partisan criticism. The
list of state and federal public officials that came out publicly in the first twentyfour hours against Attorney General Sessions’ new cannabis enforcement policy
includes: U.S. Senators Cory Gardener, R-Colorado, and Lisa Murkowski, R108. Compare Attorney General Order No. 3946-2017, supra note 9, and Deborah Connor, U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice
Criminal
Div.,
Policy
Directive
17-1
(July
19,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/file/982616/download, with Attorney General Order, Prohibition On Certain
Federal Adoptions Of Seizures By State And Local Law Enforcement Agencies (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/file/318146/download.
109. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Sessions Issues
Policy and Guidelines on Federal Adoptions of Assets Seized by State or Local Law Enforcement (July
19,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-issues-policy-and-guidelinesfederal-adoptions-assets-seized-state.
110. Sessions Memo, supra note 10, at 1.
111. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Issues Memo
On Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issuesmemo-marijuana-enforcement.
112. Sessions Memo, supra note 10, at 1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Alaska; U.S. Representatives Earl Blumenauer, D-Oregon, and Dina Titus, DNevada; and Governors Kate Brown, D-Oregon, Jay Inslee, D-Washington, John
Hickenlooper, D-Colorado, Charlie Baker, D-Massachusetts, Phil Scott, DVermont, and Lt. Governor Gavin Newsom, D-California.115 In no uncertain terms,
these officials—all of whom reign from legal cannabis states—promised to fight
Attorney General Sessions’ new policy, including by holding up confirmation of
DOJ nominees.116 Additionally, U.S. Attorneys from the Western District of
Washington, District of Colorado, and District of Maine forecast no significant
shifts in their offices’ cannabis enforcement strategies under the new Sessions
policy.117 However, while there is some indication that cannabis enforcement
strategy on the ground may not see a drastic shift in priorities, it is also worth
noting that of the 93 U.S. Attorney positions across the United States, President
Trump has nominated 58 individuals to fill these positions—46 of whom have been
confirmed.118 As a result, it is probable that some federal prosecutors, like Trumpappointee for U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts Andrew Lelling, will
“aggressively” pursue cannabis crimes—even in states like Massachusetts, where
the plant has been legalized.119
Although presidential administrations and policies have changed
concerning cannabis enforcement, the law has not—leaving valid much of the Cole
doctrine as guidance to states (and Indian tribes) establishing or with established
cannabis programs on their lands. First, because the CSA still contains no provision
preempting state or tribal laws legalizing recreational and medical cannabis, this
means that even under the Sessions policy state laws and tribal ordinances
legalizing cannabis remain valid.
Second, Cole doctrine instructs that unless one or more of the stated
priorities are triggered in a given case (e.g., curbing cartel and gang activity,
preventing flow of cannabis into states where the plant remains illegal, or
preventing distribution to minors), federal intervention is generally unwarranted.
This policy is not inconsistent with Sessions’ position, which directs federal
prosecutors to evaluate the “seriousness” of the crime, “the deterrent effect” of
prosecution, and the “cumulative impact of the particular crimes on the
community” in determining whether to prosecute a given cannabis case. Cole
doctrine simply sets out in practical terms for interests involved in cannabis the
same prosecutorial model of pursuing serious cannabis crimes that detrimentally
affect the community and would serve a deterrent that now guides Sessions-DOJ
cannabis enforcement.
Third, the federal budget still contains the provision precluding federally
appropriated funds from being used to prosecute and enforce the CSA against
115. Marijuana Business Daily Staff, supra note 13.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Matt Zapotosky, Sari Horwitz, & Joel Achenbach, Use of Legalized Marijuana Threatened As
Sessions Rescinds Obama-era Directive That Eased Federal Enforcement, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-is-rescinding-obama-era-directivefor-feds-to-back-off-marijuana-enforcement-in-states-with-legal-pot/2018/01/04/b1a42746-f157-11e7b3bf-ab90a706e175_story.html?utm_term=.16b6b04f8626.
119. Marijuana Business Daily Staff, supra note 13.
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cannabis enterprises in compliance with state law. This means that funding for a
crusade against state (and tribal) cannabis is significantly hindered as a financial
matter—without financing to fund large-scale cannabis raids and prosecutions in
legal cannabis states, such enforcement is unlikely to occur. This also means that
enforcement actions will likely be strategic and aimed at making examples of
cannabis enterprises either in direct violation of state and federal cannabis laws or
enterprises pushing the boundaries in the many grey areas of legal state (and tribal)
cannabis.
Finally, early signs from U.S. Attorneys’ offices located in states with
established cannabis programs (e.g. in Washington, Colorado, and Maine) indicates
that Cole doctrine is ingrained as in their prosecutorial philosophies as smart on
crime, and that they will continue to exercise the same discretion and consider the
same factors under the Trump administration and Sessions DOJ as was exercised
and as were considered under the Obama administration and Cole doctrine. In
practice, this analysis counsels that compliance with Cole doctrine remains a wise
waypoint for calibrating how to structure state (and tribal) recreational and medical
cannabis programs in the Trump-era.120
Having crossed a legal grid ranging from strict prohibition of controlled
substances under international and federal law to state cannabis legalization and
shifting priorities in DOJ CSA enforcement in the states, this article shifts to the
topic of cannabis law in Indian County.
II. Indian Cannabis Law: Issues and Approaches
Although the federal government’s policy on cannabis enforcement is a
major factor to be weighed by tribes in establishing cannabis programs on their
tribal lands, the issue of cannabis governance in Indian Country is also deeply
entangled with the laws of the states in which cannabis tribes’ lands are located.
Part II proceeds by considering the topic of cannabis Indian law, covering the
concrete legal issues driving state-tribal cannabis relations, including cases of tribal
cannabis enterprises that have been subject to law enforcement actions.
A. Federal Guidance on Cannabis in Indian Country
Federal guidance to Indian Nations in the area of cannabis on tribal lands
is largely undeveloped, but during the Obama era tracked the federal-state approach
outlined in Part I(B). In the Trump-era, however, the path is uncharted. But for the
reasons discussed supra in Part I(B), Indian tribes (as well as states) are welladvised to continue to administer or establish cannabis programs in line with the
Cole doctrine and Wilkinson Memo.
On October 28, 2014, DOJ Deputy Attorney General Monty Wilkinson
issued a policy statement concerning cannabis enforcement in Indian Country, the

120. See generally Paul Waldman, Why Sessions’s Crackdown Is Going To Make Legalization More
Likely, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2018/01/05/
why-jeff-sessions-marijuana-crackdown-is-going-to-make-legalization-more-likely/?utm_term=.88eb
6703a72b (discussing potential implications of the Sessions Memo, including that states in the interest
of exercising sovereignty may now be more likely to legalize cannabis and fight federal attempts to
disrupt cannabis markets that are in compliance with state law).
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Wilkinson Memo, in light of the continued state trend of cannabis legalization and
requests from tribes for guidance on CSA enforcement on tribal lands.121 The
Wilkinson Memo recognized that “Indian Country includes numerous reservations
and tribal lands with diverse sovereign governments, many of which traverse state
borders and federal districts” with, at times, divergent public safety concerns.122 As
a result, United States Attorneys, in determining whether to enforce federal
cannabis laws in Indian Country must consider each case on a case-by-case basis
guided by the Cole II Priorities.123 The Wilkinson Memo finally required the
United States government to consult with Indian tribes on a government-togovernment basis in evaluating whether there is a basis to enforce federal cannabis
laws in Indian Country.124
Although the Wilkinson Memo stood for the proposition that the federal
government would take the same hands-off position toward cannabis in Indian
Country as it does for the states, the policy statement was met with mixed reactions
in Indian communities.125 In particular, some tribes believed the growing of
cannabis on their lands would exacerbate substance abuse and crime on the
reservations, while others believed it could become a major economic driver in
Indian Country.126
But economic and cultural impacts of cannabis on tribal lands aside, the
issue of cannabis in Indian Country is also fraught with challenging legal issues.
These issues, examined next in this Part, are situated at the intersection of state
police and taxing power, tribal sovereignty, and intergovernmental dispute
resolution.
B. State Law & Cannabis in Indian Country: Criminal Jurisdiction, State
Taxation, Tribal Sovereign Immunity, & Dispute Resolution
Even in a legal and political environment where the federal government
takes a hands-off approach to CSA enforcement in Indian Country pursuant to the
Wilkinson Memo, the question remains: how will state governments with Indian
lands traversing their territories react to tribes’ establishment of medical or
recreational cannabis enterprises on tribal lands? Any accurate answer to this
question must approach the inquiry on a state-by-state and tribe-by-tribe basis.
However, across the board, the issues of state criminal jurisdiction, tribal sovereign
immunity, state taxation, 127 and dispute resolution constitute the central

121. Wilkinson Memo, supra note 5, at 1–2.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2–3.
125. See Jeff Barnard & Gosia Wozniacka, DOJ Ruling: Indian Tribes Can Legalize Pot on Their
Lands, CANNABIST (Dec. 11, 2014, 3:46 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2014/12/11/doj-rulingindian-tribes-states-can-decide-whether-legalize-pot/25119/.
126. Id.
127. See Kyle Montour, Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire: The State-Tribal Quandary of Tribal
Marijuana, 4 AM. INDIAN L.J. 222 (2016) (highlighting the issues arising in PL 280 and non-PL 280
states involving criminal jurisdiction, tribal sovereign immunity, and state taxation in Indian Country);
see also Melinda Smith, Native Americans and the Legalization of Marijuana: Can the Tribes Turn
Another Addiction into Affluence?, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 507 (2015).
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considerations of any tribe considering the prospect of cannabis on tribal lands or
state considering whether to enforce its cannabis laws on tribal lands. For purposes
of the analysis that follows, discussion of state criminal jurisdiction and tribal
immunity will be limited to the issues likely to arise in non-PL 280 states, like New
Mexico.128
1. State Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country in Non-PL 280 States
The first issue pertinent to state-tribal relations and cooperation
surrounding cannabis is the scope of state criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
In non-PL 280 jurisdictions, states generally only have authority to prosecute
crimes involving only non-Indians that occurred in Indian Country; and this rule
has been embraced by the New Mexico Supreme Court.129 As a result, it is unlikely
that state courts would be able to obtain criminal jurisdiction over alleged
violations of state cannabis law involving only Indian tribal members’ conduct on
tribal lands. However, this analysis leaves open the question of cases involving
non-Indians selling or purchasing and possessing cannabis originating from a tribal
cannabis enterprise. United States v. Langford,130 People v. Collins,131 and
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians132 provide guidance applicable to
tribes in non-PL 280 states like New Mexico.
In Langford, a non-Indian was convicted in Oklahoma federal district
court of the crime of watching a cockfight held on Kiowa tribal lands in violation
of state and federal law.133 On appeal of the non-Indian’s conviction, the court
determined that “states possess exclusive criminal jurisdiction over [victimless]
crimes occurring in Indian Country if there is neither an Indian victim nor an Indian

128. Although federal or tribal courts generally have criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian
Country, an exception to this rule is Public Law 83-280 (PL 280), which conferred criminal jurisdiction
on six states (Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin) over all or a portion of
Indian country within them. See, e.g., General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012); Major Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); see also Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2012)); Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545 (1958) (amending 1953 Act to add Alaska
as falling under the law); CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK §§ 4:2, :8 (2016) (“Tribal courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed by an Indian
against an Indian otherwise cognizable under the General Crimes Act; whether tribal courts have
jurisdiction concurrent with the United States over conduct constituting a major crime is
undetermined.”).
129. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984); see also State v. Harrison, 2010-NMSC-038, ¶
13, 148 N.M. 500, 238 P.3d 869 (“[A]s a general principle, a state does not have jurisdiction over crimes
committed by an Indian in Indian country”).
130. United States v. Langford, 641 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2011) (applicable to non-Indians who sell
cannabis as a tribal enterprise).
131. People v. Collins, 826 N.W.2d 175 (Mich. App. 2012) (applicable to non-Indians who
purchase/possess cannabis in Indian Country as well as controlled substance possession by non-Indian
in Indian Country); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001).
132. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); accord Montour, supra
note 127, at 230 n.32 (arguing that, although limited by Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134
S.Ct. 2024 (2014), the Cabazon criminal vs. civil-regulatory law test for whether a state may police
Indian conduct in Indian Country is still intact).
133. Langford, 548 F.3d at 1196.
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perpetrator” involved.134 As a result, the court held that because the non-Indian was
charged with having perpetrated the victimless Oklahoma state law crime of cockfight spectating, the Oklahoma state courts had jurisdiction over the defendant’s
case.135 Similarly, in Collins, two non-Indians were charged, under state law, with
delivery and possession of controlled substances, including cannabis, while inside a
casino on the land of the Hannahville Indian Community.136 The court determined
that the cannabis crimes implicated in the case were subject to the jurisdiction of
the state courts of Michigan because they fell into the category of victimless crimes
committed by non-Indian perpetrators.137
In Cabazon, the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians who
occupy reservations in Riverside County, California, pursuant to federal approval,
operated bingo games and a card club on their lands.138 The state of California and
County of Riverside pursued enforcement of a state criminal law and county
ordinance that concerned the terms under which Indian gaming could occur.139 The
bands responded by suing the Riverside County in federal court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the county had no authority to apply its ordinance on
their lands; and the state was added as a party through intervention.140 The court
fashioned a rule providing that if state law generally classifies the conduct at issue
as “civil/regulatory” as opposed to “criminal/prohibitory” (i.e., conduct that
violates public policy of the state), states may not enforce such laws on tribal
lands.141 Applying this rule, the court reasoned that because the state did not
prohibit all forms of gambling and itself operated gaming enterprises under
California law that the state gaming laws at issue were civil/regulatory.142
Therefore, because the state gaming laws at issue were civil/regulatory, the court
held that the laws could not be enforced by state and county on the bands’ lands.143
As a result, in a non-PL 280 state like New Mexico, the general principle
from the case law concerning state criminal and civil/regulatory jurisdiction on
tribal land is that the sale by or to or possession of cannabis (i.e., victimless crimes)
by non-Indians, absent an agreement between the state and tribes providing
otherwise, would likely render those non-Indians vulnerable to state court criminal
jurisdiction if charged with violations of state cannabis laws under Langford and
Collins. Additionally, and consistent with Langford and Collins, the provision of
cannabis grow consultation services by non-Indians to tribes concerning
establishing cannabis grows on tribal lands will also leave those consultants
vulnerable to state criminal jurisdiction in states where the plant remains illegal in

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1197; see also Harrison, 2010-NMSC-038, ¶ 14.
Langford, 548 F.3d at 1200.
Collins, 826 N.W.2d at 176.
Id. at 181.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 204–05.
Id. at 205–06.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 210–11.
See id. at 212.
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both the medical and recreational domains.144 However, under Cabazon, assuming
tribes in a state like New Mexico—which already has a state medical cannabis civil
regulatory system—only establish medical cannabis programs under which tribal
members serve as caregivers to tribe member patients, it is unlikely that the state
could enforce its criminal cannabis laws in Indian Country because medical
cannabis is a civil/regulatory matter under the state’s law.
2. State Taxation of Indian Tribal Cannabis Enterprises
The second issue universal to state-tribal cannabis relations is whether
states may levy direct taxes on tribal members and non-Indians for their
transactions with tribal cannabis enterprises or may assess fees—de facto taxes—
from tribal cannabis enterprises to operate (e.g., in a manner reminiscent of the
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 discussed supra in Part I(A)). Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation145 provides the clearest
guidance on the validity of state taxation of tribal cannabis, standing for the
proposition that states are permitted to levy taxes in Indian Country when state
interests are implicated outside of a tribe’s lands.146
In Colville, tribes in the state of Washington sold cigarettes at tribal
smokeshops under the authority of tribal ordinances.147 Tribal members as well as
non-Indians were permitted to purchase cigarettes from these tribal smokeshops.148
However, the tribes were not collecting a state cigarette tax from non-tribal
member cigarette purchasers as required under Washington law.149 So the state
sought to enforce its tax by seizing, as contraband, cigarettes being transported to
tribal lands from outside wholesalers.150 The tribes sued the state in federal court
for a declaratory judgment that the state’s cigarette tax could not be levied on tribal
lands and to enjoin the state from seizing cigarettes being transported to the
tribes.151 The tribes’ theory of the case relied, inter alia, on the argument that the
state tax and cigarette seizures contravened the tribe’s right to govern itself.152 The
court determined that Washington had the authority to require the tribes to collect a
state cigarette tax from non-Indian purchasers.153 The court reasoned that the state’s
interest in enforcing its lawful cigarette tax on non-Indian cigarette purchasers by
seizing cigarettes being transported to tribal lands was sufficient where the tribes

144. Jonathan Ellis, Consultant Found Not Guilty in Flandreau Marijuana Trial, ARGUS LEADER
(May 24, 2017), http://www.argusleader.com/story/news/crime/2017/05/24/eric-hagen-found-not-guiltyflandreau-marijuana-trial/342971001/ (Attorney General of South Dakota Marty Jackley reasoning that
the state had jurisdiction to indict and try non-Indian cannabis grow consultants for their provision of
cannabis grow consultation services to the Flandreau Santee Sioux tribe on grounds that states have
“jurisdiction to prosecute victimless crimes committed by non-Indians.”).
145. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
146. See Montour, supra note 127, at 238–39.
147. Colville, 447 U.S. at 144.
148. See id. at 134.
149. See id. at 144–45.
150. Id. at 142.
151. Id. at 139.
152. Id. at 154.
153. Id. at 161.

Winter 2018

NEW MEXICO TRIBAL CANNABIS

99

refused to collect and remit that revenue to the state.154 As a result, the court held
that the principle of tribal self-government did not authorize the tribes to ignore
state taxes on the sale of goods to non-Indians.155
Thus, absent an agreement between a state and tribes providing otherwise,
a state may be able to regulate the sale of recreational cannabis on tribal land
through taxing cannabis transactions involving non-Indians under Colville’s
“sufficient state interest” test and proper legislation levying a lawful state cannabis
sales tax on non-Indians. However, tribal medical (and likely recreational) cannabis
grown, sold, and purchased by tribal members is unlikely to be subject to taxes
levied by states, even under Colville, because where only tribal members are
involved in a cannabis transaction with a tribal cannabis enterprise, the argument
fails that a state would have a sufficient interest in taxing that transaction. And in
the limited context of tribal medical cannabis programs established under the
authority of state law and regulations, states may be able to levy de facto taxes on
tribal cannabis enterprises akin to the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. De facto taxes
are identifiable in statutory and regulatory forms as: fees associated with the
acquisition of a medical cannabis card, licensure of cannabis caregivers’ grow
operations, and cannabis grow and dispensary operational compliance costs or fees.
To avoid de facto taxation, tribes should, as discussed in detail infra Part IV(A),
either compact around establishing tribal medical cannabis programs under the
authority of state medical cannabis law and programs or include provisions in a
state-tribal medical cannabis compact exempting or requiring a timely refund of
such fees to tribal governments.
3. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The third issue directly bearing upon state-tribal relations and cannabis is
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Because Indian tribes are domestic
dependent nations that exercise sovereign authority over their territories, Indian
tribes possess immunity from suit to the same extent enjoyed by all other sovereign
powers.156 This means tribal governments are immune from suit unless: a) the tribe
expressly and clearly waives immunity; b) Congress has unequivocally abrogated
tribal sovereign immunity; or c) the suit is brought against a tribe by the federal
government.157 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community is a principal case on the
issue of tribal sovereign immunity.158
In Bay Mills, the State of Michigan entered into a compact with a tribe
pursuant to the Indian Gaming Reform Act (IGRA), which authorized the tribe to
conduct Class III gaming, i.e., to open a casino on tribal lands.159 The compact
provided that nothing in the agreement was to be deemed a waiver of tribal or state
154. Id. at 161–62.
155. See id. at 155.
156. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S.Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
157. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991); E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Velarde, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1315 (D.N.M. 1999).
158. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014).
159. Id. at 2026.
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sovereign immunity; and the tribe prosperously operated a casino established under
this compact on its reservation.160 The tribe then established another Class III
gaming operation off of tribal lands, and the state sued to enjoin this second
gaming enterprise as a violation of IGRA.161 The court determined that the
provision of the IGRA authorizing the state to sue the tribe to enjoin Class III
gaming activity located on Indian lands would abrogate the tribe’s sovereign
immunity in that narrow circumstance.162 However, the court held that the same
authority did not abrogate the tribe’s sovereign immunity in the case before it.163
This was because the state-tribal compact at issue did not contain a general waiver
of the tribe’s sovereign immunity permitting it to be sued for gaming operations off
tribal lands and IGRA did not extend to suits seeking to enjoin operation of a
casino operated outside of tribal lands.164
Additionally, as states, including New Mexico and tribal nations within
state boundaries, begin to navigate resolution of disputes in the domain of medical
or recreational cannabis in Indian Country, the sovereign status of tribal
enterprises, officials, and employees should be considered. As a general matter,
tribal officials and members employed by a tribe acting in the scope of their
delegated tribal duties are afforded immunity from suit.165 This is based on the
law’s recognition of tribal corporations as arms of tribal governments, which enjoy
sovereign immunity.166 However, tribal sovereign immunity is unlikely to extend to
business enterprises on tribal lands owned, even in part, by non-Indians.167
Additionally, the doctrine of Ex parte Young168 extends to tribal officials, allowing
suits against them for declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of law
occurring in their tribal official capacity.169

160. Id. at 2029.
161. Id. at 2026, 2029.
162. Id. at 2032.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2032, 2035.
165. Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Burrell v. Armijo, 603 F.3d 825,
832–35 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding tribal Governor was entitled to official immunity from suit related to
his issuance of a “no-[alfalfa ]baling directive” to farmer lessees because the action was within the
Governor’s official authority); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe., 204 F.3d 343, 359 (2d Cir. 2000)
(citing Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir. 1996), for the proposition that a government official
sued in their official capacity loses official immunity only when they act manifestly or palpably beyond
their authority).
166. Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]ribal corporations
acting as an arm of the tribe enjoy the same sovereign immunity granted to a tribe itself.”)
167. Id. at 726 (finding it significant in determining the tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit
that the tribal business was wholly owned and operated by the tribe); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464
F.3d 1044, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).
168. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex parte Young has evolved to stand for the
proposition that plaintiffs may seek declaratory and injunctive relief from state officials where the
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks only prospective relief. See 17A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4232 (3d. ed.
2017).
169. E.g., Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 862 F.3d 1236, 1251 (10th
Cir. 2017).
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As a result, the case law surrounding tribal sovereign immunity instructs
that unless states and tribes compact around tribal sovereign immunity, i.e., waive
sovereign immunity in the arena of disputes concerning cannabis on tribal lands,
neither state nor tribal governments are likely to be subject to civil suits brought by
the other. However, tribal officials may be vulnerable to suits against them in their
official capacity brought under the doctrine of Ex parte Young or for conduct
“manifestly or palpably” beyond an official’s tribal authority. And a tribal cannabis
enterprise may lose its privilege of sovereign immunity where the enterprise is less
than wholly owned by the tribe.
4. State-Tribal Dispute Resolution in the Courts
The final Indian cannabis law issue concerns the law applicable to the
resolution of disputes between states and tribes that make it into the courts. At least
one state trial court case, Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, has determined that
contracts concerning the cultivation of cannabis are unenforceable in the courts.170
In Hammer, a lender entered into loan agreements with a Nevada-based
retail cannabis sales and cultivation center (THC) to grow cannabis in Colorado
where medical cannabis was legal.171 THC defaulted on the loans by failing to
timely pay the interest pursuant to the terms of the loan agreements.172 As a result,
the lender sued to enforce the loan agreements.173 The Arizona state trial court
determined that the loan agreements were unenforceable and void as a violation of
public policy.174 This was chiefly because cannabis is federally illegal, and courts
cannot enforce contracts with illegal purposes, such as a cannabis cultivation
agreement.175
Even though Hammer stands for the proposition that agreements
concerning the cultivation of cannabis will be ruled void, it is unlikely that other
state trial courts will adopt the Hammer approach. First, Hammer is not binding in
any jurisdiction based on its status as a ruling of an Arizona state trial court.
Second, Hammer is unlikely to be persuasive in subsequent cases because the court
unnecessarily relied on federal law to void the loan agreements in a contract
dispute presumably executed in compliance and in reliance on Arizona and
Colorado medical cannabis law.176 Moreover, states, including New Mexico,
generally apply the rule that the validity of a contract must be determined by the
law of the state in which it was made. Thus, the federal CSA is unlikely to be
applied to void cannabis contracts and compacts where such instruments comply

170. Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, Nos. CV 2011-051310, CV 2011-051311 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
Apr. 17, 2012), 2012 WL 12874349.
171. Id. at 1.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 2 (emphasis added) (citing Arizona state law cases for the proposition that “[a]n
agreement is unenforceable if the acts to be performed would be illegal or would violate public policy”).
175. Id. (“The explicitly stated purpose of these loan agreements was to finance the sale and
distribution of marijuana. This was in clear violation of the laws of the United States, [i.e., the CSA]”).
176. See id. at 1 (“The retail medical marijuana sales and grow center [at issue] was located in
Colorado. Colorado, like Arizona, has adopted a scheme by which patients may obtain amounts of
marijuana for medicinal purposes.”)
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with the cannabis laws in the state in which they are executed—even in a federal
court.177
As a result, where Hammer demonstrates that a state trial court may void
cannabis agreements on public policy grounds, states and tribes compacting for the
establishment of cannabis enterprises in Indian Country will be wise to negotiate
for a mutually beneficial dispute resolution process. Such a process will focus on
alternatives to litigation and compliance with the Wilkinson Memo.
Having navigated the complexity of criminal jurisdiction, state taxation on
tribal lands, sovereign immunity, and state-tribal dispute resolution facing tribes
that consider entering into the field of cannabis, the focus of this Part shifts to
illustration of these issues through specific instances of Indian cannabis cases and
controversies.
C. Tribal Cannabis Since the Wilkinson Memo: Cases of Success and
Failure
Since the issuance of the Wilkinson Memo, only a minority of the
federally-recognized tribes are reported to be considering entry into the cannabis
industry in one form or another.178 However, this group of tribes has been active in
their initiatives and exploration of cannabis, which have ranged from the creation
of the National Indian Cannabis Coalition179 to NCAI’s adoption of the “Marijuana
and Hemp Policy in Indian Country” joint resolution, which takes the position that
Indian tribes’ inherent right as sovereign governments empowers them to set local
laws addressing cannabis, including medical and industrial uses according to the
public health and economic needs of their unique communities.180

177. Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 2013-NMSC-022, ¶ 14, 303 P.3d 814 (“As a
general proposition of law, it is settled that the validity of a contract must be determined by the law of
the state in which it was made”) (quoting Boggs v. Anderson, 72 N.M. 136, 140, 381 P.2d 419, 422
(1963)); Colorado Interstate Corp. v. CIT Grp./Equip. Fin., Inc., 993 F.2d 743, 749 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating that, where sophisticated parties enter into an agreement setting forth their rights and
obligations, the terms of the agreement should control unless the agreement would otherwise be void
under state law).
178. Gene Johnson, Indian Tribes Converge in Washington State to Discuss Marijuana Legalization,
CANNABIST (Feb. 27, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/02/27/indian-tribes-marijuanalegalization-washington-state/30622/ (75 of 566 federally recognized tribes were represented at the
conference; some tribes, particularly smaller tribes, were interested in the economic viability of cannabis
with an eye toward self-sustainability; other tribes remained reluctant, especially to the proposition of
getting ahead of state law).
179. Ricardo Baca, Exclusive: National Indian Cannabis Coalition Aims to Bring Tribes Together,
CANNABIST (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/03/09/national-indian-cannabiscoalition/31358/ (discussing the National Indian Cannabis Collation’s creation and interview with
physician and Mohawk tribe member, Allyson Doctor).
180. Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians Res. SD-15-046, Gen. Assemb. (2015). See Troy A. Eid,
Opinion: Indian Youth Entangled in Colorado’s Marijuana Experiment, CANNABIST (July 28, 2014,
7:59 AM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2014/07/28/american-indian-colorado-marijuana-experiment/
17016/, for an argument that marijuana adversely affects other states and Indian tribes through
“diversion” of tribal cannabis into states where it is still illegal and that Indian children are
disproportionately affected by diverted marijuana because Indian country contains some of the poorest
and crime-prone places in the country.
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Despite some tribes’ strong position in support of cannabis in Indian
Country, the earliest rollouts of tribal cannabis enterprises on tribal lands were
sloppy at best and rose to the level of Cole II Priority violations at their worst. For
example, in July 2015, federal agents raided the Alturas Indian Rancheria and Pit
River tribes in California on information that grows were occurring on the
reservations exceeding California medical marijuana standards.181 The raid resulted
in the seizure of more than 12,000 cannabis plants182 (clearly implicating the
Wilkinson policy of incentivizing establishment of strong tribal regulatory regimes
and triggering the priority of enforcing the CSA in cases of tribal cannabis
enterprises serving as pretext for illegal activity (e.g., like growing more plants
than allowed under state law)). Similarly, on September 22, 2015, in Mendocino
County, California Police seized 400 cannabis plants from the Pinoleville Pomo
Indian Nation being grown on tribal lands after the tribe made public statements
that it intended to profit from its cannabis cultivation, which violated California
state law.183
In South Dakota, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe was able to avoid a
state or federal raid of its summer 2015 cannabis grow operation on its tribal lands
by voluntarily burning its crop prior to enforcement;184 however, two non-Indian
cannabis growing consultants from the Colorado-based Monarch America firm
(Eric Hagen and Jonathan Hunt), who were hired by the tribe to assist it in
constructing its grow, were charged with multiple counts of felony possession,
attempt, and conspiracy to possess large quantities of cannabis under South Dakota
state law.185
At Hagen’s trial, the jury was instructed to determine two issues: 1)
whether Hagen possessed cannabis or intended to possess cannabis; and 2) whether
he engaged in a conspiracy to possess cannabis.186 In its case-in-chief, the state
argued that because Hagen’s consultation services put him, at times, in control of
cannabis, that his actions met the elements of possession.187 The prosecutor for the
state compared the state’s theory of possession to a teenager driving a car owned by
181. Feds Seize Marijuana from Indian Tribal Lands in California, CANNABIST (July 8, 2015, 6:27
PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/07/08/california-indian-tribes-marijuana-federal-seizure/37695/.
182. Id.
183. California Tribe’s Marijuana Operation Raided in Mendocino County, CANNABIST, (Sept. 23,
2015, 2:42 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/09/23/california-tribal-marijuana-raid-mendocinocounty/41339/.
184. Regina Garcia Cano, South Dakota Tribe Burned Pot Crop Over Fear of Federal Raid,
CANNABIST (Nov. 9, 2015, 3:27 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/11/09/south-dakota-marijuanatribal-lands-tribe-burned-pot-crop-fear-federal-raid/43555/.
185. Press Release, Office of the South Dakota Attorney General, Charges Filed in Connection with
Marijuana
Grow
Facility
in
Flandreau
(Aug.
3,
2016),
https://atg.sd.gov/OurOffice/Media/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?id=1621; Ellis, supra note 144. Hagen,
President of Monarch America, Inc., was charged and indicted for one count of conspiracy to possess
more than 10 lbs. of cannabis (a class 3 felony punishable up to 10 years imprisonment) and one count
of possession of more than 10 lbs. of cannabis (a class 3 felony punishable by up to 7.5 years
imprisonment). Id. Hunt, Vice President of Monarch America, Inc., was charged with and plead guilty
to one count of conspiracy to possess more than one-half lb. but less than one lb. of cannabis (a class 6
felony punishable by up to two years imprisonment). Id.
186. Ellis, supra note 144.
187. Id.
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her parents, i.e., although the car is actually owned by the parents, the teenager
possesses the vehicle while she drives it.188 In Hagen’s defense, Flandreau Santee
Sioux Chairman, Tony Reider, testified that the tribe owned the cannabis with
which Hagen was charged with possessing.189 Hagen and Hunt also both took the
stand to testify that the extent of their involvement in the grow operation was
limited to offering advice to the tribe based on their experience in the cannabis
growing industry.190 Counsel for Hagen also argued that there was no evidence of a
conspiracy where the tribe had legalized cannabis by tribal ordinance and Hagen
and the tribe had been open with authorities about the grow operation, citing
invitations made by the tribe inviting South Dakota state lawmakers, media, and the
FBI to tour its grow facilities.191 After a four-day trial and a short deliberation, the
twelve-person jury acquitted Hagen of all charges.192 But notwithstanding the
favorable ruling, neither Monarch America nor the Flandreau Santee Sioux are
currently contemplating reestablishment of the tribal grow.193
However, where the California and South Dakota tribes failed in their
early attempts to enter into the cannabis industry, Indian tribes located within the
states of Washington and Nevada, respectively, have achieved unprecedented
success. During the 2015 and 2017 regular sessions of the Washington and Nevada
state legislatures, bills (the “cannabis compacting” bills or legislation) were passed
permitting those states to engage in government-to-government negotiations with
tribes for the establishment of cannabis programs on tribal lands.194 On the heels of
the enactment of HB 2000 in the State of Washington, the Suquamish, Puyallup,
and Squaxin became the first tribes to enter into cannabis compacts with the State
of Washington for the establishment of recreational cannabis stores and a research
center for medical cannabis on their tribal lands.195 To date, there is no indication

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id.; Jacob Sullum, South Dakota Jury Acquits Tribal Cannabis Consultant of All Charges,
REASON.COM (May 25, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/05/25/south-dakota-jury-acquitstribal-cannabi.
191. Ellis, supra note 144; Sullum, supra note 190.
192. Consultant Not Guilty at Marijuana Trial, KSFY, (May 24, 2017, 9:13 AM), http://www.ksfy.
com/content/news/South-Dakota-jury-to-get-case-of-man-charged-in-pot-resort-424069624.html.
193. See Ellis, supra note 144 (reporting that Flandreau Santee Sioux Chairman Reider “said the
tribe did not want a repeat of what happened in 2015, but was monitoring the situation at the federal
level to see if there would be any changes in the future”); see also James Nord, South Dakota Jury Finds
Consultant Not Guilty in Pot Case, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 24, 2017, 5:09 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/south-dakota/articles/2017-05-24/south-dakota-jury-to-getcase-of-man-charged-in-pot-resort (reporting that after his acquittal, Hagen stated that the case against
him had damaged his business, Monarch America, Inc.).
194. S.B. 375, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/79th2017/
Bills/SB/SB375_EN.pdf; H.B. 2000, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/
biennium/2015-16/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2000.pdf.
195. Suquamish Cannabis Compact, supra note 18; Squaxin Cannabis Compact, supra note 18;
Puyallup Cannabis Compact, supra note 18; see also Suquamish Tribe and Washington State Agree to
Historic Cannabis Compact, MARIJUANAPOLITICS (Sept. 15, 2015), http://marijuanapolitics.com/
suquamish-tribe-and-washington-state-agree-to-historic-cannabis-compact/; Tobias Coughlin-Bogue,
Washington State’s Second Native American-Owned Pot Shop Is a Big Win For Tribal Sovereignty,
STRANGER (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/2015/12/08/23245665/washington-
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that the cannabis enterprises located on these tribes’ lands have either triggered
federal interest under the Wilkinson Memo or clashed with federal, state, or local
law enforcement.
Similarly in the State of Nevada, shortly after the enactment of SB 375,
three federally recognized tribes in the state—the Ely Shoshone, Yerington Paiute,
and Las Vegas Paiute—entered into compacts with the State of Nevada to cultivate,
infuse, study, and dispense recreational and medical cannabis on their tribal
lands.196 Evincing the success of the state-tribal cannabis compacts executed in
Nevada, in particular, is the case of the Las Vegas Paiute that recently opened the
self-proclaimed largest cannabis retail facility in the United States on its tribal
lands located in downtown Las Vegas—approximately two blocks from the
Freemont Street Experience—again without indication of federal, state, or local law
enforcement interest or interdiction.197
Considering the California, South Dakota, Washington, and Nevada cases
together, there are two major takeaways from tribes’ ventures into cannabis since
the Wilkinson Memo. First, the Alturas Indian Rancheria, Pit River, and Pinoleville
Pomo Indian Nation cases demonstrate that the federal government will not hesitate
to enforce the CSA on tribal lands where it receives information that a tribal
cannabis grow violates the Wilkinson Memo by triggering Cole II Priorities.
Additionally, there is no indication in these cases that federal government
consultation with the California tribes occurred prior to the enforcement of the
CSA on tribal lands as is required, at least in theory, under the Wilkinson Memo.
Second, absent an agreement providing otherwise, state governments will be
similarly obliged to enforce State cannabis laws on tribal lands if they become
aware of alleged violations of those laws. However, where tribes, like the
Suquamish, Puyallup, and Squaxin of the state of Washington and the Ely
Shoshone, Yerington Paiute, and Las Vegas Paiute tribes of the State of Nevada,

states-second-native-american-owned-pot-shop-is-a-big-win-for-tribal-sovereignty (interview with
Suquamish’s cannabis attorney); Squaxin Island Tribe Enters Marijuana Compact In Washington,
INDIANZ.COM (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.indianz.com/News/2015/019025.asp; First Native American
Cannabis Business Opens, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Nov. 16, 2015), http://mjbizdaily.com/first-nativeamerican-cannabis-business-opens/ (reporting on opening of Washington-based Squaxin Island Tribe’s
first dispensary and providing details on the business); Washington Signs 3rd Tribal Compact as
Puyallup Tribe to Open Cannabis Testing Lab, NEW CANNABIS VENTURES (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.newcannabisventures.com/washington-signs-3rd-tribal-compact-as-puyallup-tribe-to-opencannabis-testing-lab/; Jordan Schraeder, Pallyup Tribe Plans Pot Testing Lab, OLYMPIAN (Jan. 27,
2016), http://www.theolympian.com/news/local/marijuana/article56927813.html; John Gillie, Two
Marijuana Retailors Opening Soon In City That Still Bans Cannabis Sales, NEWS TRIBUNE (Jan. 28,
2017), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/marijuana/article128704919.html.
196. Ely Shoshone Cannabis Compact, supra note 18; Yerington Paiute Cannabis Compact, supra
note 18; Las Vegas Paiute Cannabis Compact, supra note 18; Debra Krol, Nevada Tribes Get Medical
Marijuana Compacts, INDIAN COUNTY TODAY (Sept. 1, 2017), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/
news/business/nevada-tribes-get-medical-marijuana-compacts/.
197. Chris Kudialis, Tribal Pot Store Near Downtown Las Vegas To Be Biggest In the Country, L.V.
SUN (Aug. 3 2017), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/aug/03/tribal-pot-store-near-downtown-lasvegas-aims-to-b/; Chris Kudialis, ‘Years in the Making’: Tribal Pot Store Downtown To Open Monday,
L.V. SUN (Oct. 15, 2017), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/oct/15/years-in-the-making-massivetribal-pot-store-near/; Home, NUWU CANNABIS MARKETPLACE (last visited Nov. 4, 2017), https://www
.nuwucannabis.com/.
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execute compacts with the states in which their lands lie providing for the terms
that will govern state-tribal relations around cannabis, it is possible to establish
mutually beneficial tribal cannabis programs that minimize the risk of law
enforcement intervention on tribal lands by another sovereign.
D. Washington and Nevada Tribal Cannabis Legislation and Cannabis
Compacts
The success of Washington and Nevada’s tribal cannabis legal regimes
stem from the particular terms of the cannabis compacting legislation and statetribal compacts executed between the State of Washington and the Suquamish,
Puyallup, Squaxin tribes and state of Nevada and the Ely Shoshone, Yerington
Paiute, and Las Vegas Paiute tribes. In particular, the cannabis compacting
legislation confers authority on the governors of Washington and Nevada to
negotiate, government-to-government, with tribes in their states for individualized
state-tribal cannabis compacts, including those which address the four central
Indian cannabis law issues discussed supra Part II(C)(1)–(4): state criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country, tribal sovereign immunity, state taxation, and
dispute resolution.
The Washington cannabis compacting bill, HB 2000, provides in pertinent
part:
The legislature intends to further the government-to-government
relationship between the state of Washington and federally
recognized Indian tribes in the state of Washington by
authorizing the governor to enter into agreements concerning the
regulation of marijuana. Such agreements may include provisions
pertaining to: The lawful commercial production, processing,
sale, and possession of marijuana for both recreational and
medical purposes; marijuana-related research activities; law
enforcement, both criminal and civil; and taxation. The
legislature finds that these agreements will facilitate and promote
a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the
state and the tribes regarding matters relating to the legalization
of marijuana, particularly in light of the fact that federal Indian
law precludes the state from enforcing its civil regulatory laws in
Indian country. Such cooperative agreements will enhance public
health and safety, ensure a lawful and well-regulated marijuana
market, encourage economic development, and provide fiscal
benefits to both the tribes and the state.198
Nevada’s cannabis compacting bill, SB 375, similarly provides:
1. The Governor or his or her designee may enter into one or
more agreements with tribal governments in this State to
efficiently coordinate the cross-jurisdictional administration of
the laws of this State and the laws of tribal governments relating

198. H.B. 2000, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/201516/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2000.pdf
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to the use of marijuana. Such an agreement may include, without
limitation, provisions relating to:
(a) Criminal and civil law enforcement;
(b) Regulatory issues relating to the possession, delivery,
production, processing or use of marijuana, edible marijuana
products, marijuana-infused products and marijuana products;
(c) Medical and pharmaceutical research involving marijuana;
(d) The administration of laws relating to taxation;
(e) Any immunity, preemption or conflict of law relating to the
possession, delivery, production, processing, transportation or
use of marijuana, edible marijuana products, marijuana infused
products and marijuana products; and
(f) The resolution of any disputes between tribal government and
this State, which may include, without limitation, the use of
mediation or other nonjudicial processes.
1. An agreement entered into pursuant to this section must:
(a) Provide for the preservation of public health and safety;
(b) Ensure the security of medical marijuana establishments and
marijuana establishments and the corresponding facilities on
tribal land; and
(c) Establish provisions regulating business involving marijuana
which passes between land and non-tribal land in this State.199
Based on the broad authority conferred on the Governors of Washington
and Nevada to negotiate with tribes in their states concerning tribes’ establishment
of tribal cannabis enterprises, the Suquamish and Squaxin cannabis compacts (after
which the Ely Shoshone, Yerington Paiute, and Las Vegas Paiute tribes’ state-tribal
cannabis compacts were closely modeled), in particular, appear to be the product of
negotiations that addressed head-on the four central Indian cannabis law issues.
First, the Squaxin cannabis compact’s “Safety and Enforcement” provision states
that “[t]he Tribe shall address safety and enforcement issues in accordance with . . .
this Compact, and internal policies and controls of the Tribe or Tribal
Enterprise.”200 The provision also establishes procedure for “Premises Checks” and
“Compliance Checks-Minors.” Under these terms, the “Squaxin Police Department
or other authorized agency” may conduct cannabis enterprise premises checks to
ensure: a) minors are not being sold cannabis on tribal lands, and b) tribal
compliance with the compact.201 The state is also authorized to conduct its own
premises- and minor-compliance checks, but only if the tribe is given “reasonable
notice,” the check is conducted with Squaxin Police observation and participation,
and the results of the check are shared with the tribe.202 Additionally, both parties
agree “to cooperate in good faith” to undertake all state requested checks jointly,

199. S.B. 375, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/79th2017/
Bills/SB/SB375_EN.pdf.
200. Squaxin Cannabis Compact, supra note 18, at 8 (emphasis added); but see Suquamish Cannabis
Compact, supra note 18, at 8 (emphasis added) (providing that “[t]he Tribe and the State shall address
safety and enforcement issues in accordance with . . . this Compact, and internal policies and controls of
the Tribe and Tribal Enterprise”).
201. Squaxin Cannabis Compact, supra note 18, at 9.
202. Id. at 9–10.

108

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 58

but that “if the Squaxin Police Department is unable or unwilling to arrange and
conduct a properly requested premises [or minor compliance] check[s] 48 hours
after receiving the original written notice[, then] the [State Liquor] Board may then
perform” the check “on its own without the Squaxin Police Department.”203
Second, the Squaxin cannabis compact’s “Tax” provision states that “no
State Tax or fee, assessment, or other charge may be assessed against or collected
from the Tribe, Tribe Enterprises, Tribal Member Businesses, State Licensees, or
retail customers related to any commercial activity related to the production,
processing, sale, and possession of marijuana products” governed by the
compact.204 The only exception to this rule allows Washington to require tribal
enterprises to pay a licensing fee for the application, issuance and renewal of a
license to grow and sell cannabis under state law.205 The term also provides that the
Squaxin “Tribe shall impose and maintain a Tribal Tax that is equal to at least 100
percent of the State Tax on all sales of marijuana products” on tribal land unless: 1)
the sale is to the tribe, tribal Enterprise, tribal member business, or an enrolled
member of the tribe; 2) the cannabis product was grown, produced, or processed in
Indian Country; 3) the transaction is otherwise exempt from state cannabis taxation
under the state or federal law; or 4) the transaction involves medical cannabis
products used in the course of medical treatments.206 The tribe may also choose to
levy a tribal tax on any cannabis transaction “that may otherwise be exempt,” but
agrees to use all proceeds of tribal taxes for “Essential Government Services.”207
Third, the Suquamish and Squaxin cannabis compacts contain identical
“Sovereign Immunity” provisions stating that:
The State agrees that except for the limited purpose of resolving
disputes . . . the signing of this Compact by the Tribe does not
imply a waiver of sovereign immunity by the Tribe or any of its
subdivisions or enterprises and is not intended as a waiver of
sovereign immunity and that any action by the State in regard to
marijuana regulation by the Tribe shall be in accord with this
Compact.208
Finally, the Suquamish and Squaxin cannabis compacts contain “Dispute
Resolution” provisions stating that neither party, nor officers acting on behalf of
either party, may petition a court to enforce the compact, unless: 1) the dispute
resolution process contained in the compact has been followed in good faith
without successful resolution; or 2) the other party fails to enter into the dispute
resolution process.209 In this regard, the Ely Shoshone and Yerington Paiute
cannabis compacts add an additional caveat to the provision by inserting a judicial
litigation forum selection, venue, and limited waiver of sovereign immunity
203. Id.
204. Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Suquamish Cannabis Compact, supra note 18, at 11; Squaxin Cannabis Compact, supra note
18, at 11.
209. Squaxin Cannabis Compact, supra note 18, at 10.
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clause.210 The Ely Shoshone and Yerington Paiute compacts provide that “[s]hould
litigation arise under this Compact, the Parties agree:” that the litigation must occur
in federal district court for the District of Nevada “and any court having appellate
jurisdiction thereover[.]”211 The clause continues that “[v]enue for said litigation
shall be the Northern District of the United States District Court of Nevada located
in Reno, Nevada” and that the state and tribe mutually waive any claim to forum
nonconveniens should litigation be filed in that court.212 The clause concludes by
providing that both “Parties waive their sovereign immunity from suit only in said
United States District Court of Nevada, and only for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief. . . . No waiver of sovereign immunity extends to monetary relief
of any kind” including attorneys’ fees and costs, which the parties agree must be
borne by each party.213
The non-judicial dispute resolution process under the Squaxin cannabis
compact is three-part.214 As a general matter, either party “may invoke the dispute
resolution process by notifying the other, in writing, of its intent to do so. The
notice must set out the issues in dispute and the notifying Parties’ position on each
issue.”215 Once the dispute resolution process has been invoked by notice, the first
step is for the parties to set up a “face-to-face meeting” for the parties’
representatives to attempt to resolve the dispute by negotiation.216 If negotiation
does not resolve the parties’ dispute, the second step in the dispute resolution is
mediation.217 In this step, the parties agree to “engage the services of a mutually
agreed upon qualified mediator to assist them in attempting to negotiate the
dispute.”218 The parties also agree to pursue mediation in “good faith until the
dispute is resolved or until the mediator determines that the Parties are not able to
resolve the dispute.”219 In the event mediation fails to result in a resolution to the
parties’ dispute, or one party terminates the dispute resolution process before
completion, the third step of the process is triggered—binding arbitration.220 The
arbitration term requires, at minimum, that one party initiate binding “arbitration
proceedings under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association,” but permits
the parties to choose another institutional arbitrator to conduct the arbitration
proceedings.221 If the arbitrator “determines that a Party is in violation of a material
provision of this Compact,” then the other party may terminate the compact;
210. See Ely Shoshone Cannabis Compact, supra note 18, at 9; Yerington Paiute Cannabis Compact,
supra note 18, at 9.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 10–11.
215. Id. at 10.
216. Id. (“The meeting must be convened within 30 days after the receiving Party’s receipt of the
written notice,” and each party’s representatives must come with the authority to resolve dispute; any
resolution reached will be memorialized in a writing signed by the parties).
217. Id. at 10–11.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 11 (any resolution to the dispute will be memorialized in a writing signed by both parties,
which will be binding upon the parties).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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however, an arbitrator “shall have no authority to award monetary damages or issue
injunctive or other equitable relief.”222 And, in the context of suits against the state
or tribe by a third party over a state-tribal cannabis compact “challenging either the
Tribe’s or the State’s authority to enter into or enforce this Compact, the Parties
each agree to support the Compact and defend . . . their authority to enter into and
implement this Compact.”223
Having identified the federal position on cannabis in Indian Country,
considered the four central issues in Indian cannabis law, reviewed accounts of
tribes’ failures and successes in establishing cannabis enterprises on tribal lands,
and conducted a close reading of the relevant portions of the Washington and
Nevada cannabis compacting legislation and compacts, this article turns to the
question of whether and in what form a tribal cannabis regime may be established
on tribal lands in the state of New Mexico.
III. Cannabis on State and Tribal Lands in New Mexico
New Mexico, with the support and lobbying of Lynn Pierson (a young
cancer patient) in the late 1970s, was the first state to establish a program where
cannabis was used as a medicine to alleviate suffering in individuals undergoing
chemotherapy.224 However, the state has been slow to join its neighboring Western
states in cannabis legalization and cultural amelioration through state public policy
and politics. This quasi-legal status is currently the central source of uncertainty to
the tribes, Nations, and Pueblos of New Mexico that may be considering
establishing tribal cannabis enterprises. The contours of New Mexico cannabis law
and politics are, therefore, the subject of Part III.
A. State and Tribal Cannabis: The Legal and Political Landscape
New Mexico cannabis law and politics are rooted in the Lynn and Erin
Compassionate Use Act (Compassionate Use Act) that was adopted by the New
Mexico Legislature in 2007, which established a medical cannabis program in the
state.225 The purpose of the act is “to allow the beneficial use of medical cannabis
in a regulated system for alleviating symptoms caused by debilitating medical
conditions226 and their medical treatments.”227 Qualified medical cannabis patients

222. Id.
223. Suquamish, supra note 18, at 11; Squaxin Cannabis Compact, supra note 18, at 11.
224. LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 18
(1997), https://books.google.com/books?id=B4TsXLl5CjIC&pg=PA18#v=onepage&q&f=false; Abq
Journal News Staff, 9:40am—Gov. Pushes Medical Marijuana Bill, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Feb. 7, 2007),
https://www.abqjournal.com/23857/940am-gov-pushes-medical-marijuana-bill.html.
225. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2b-1 to -7 (2007).
226. 7.34.3.3 N.M. ADMIN. CODE. “Debilitating medical condition” means: 1) cancer; 2) glaucoma;
3) multiple sclerosis; 4) damage to the nervous tissue of the spinal cord, with objective neurological
indication of intractable spasms; 5) epilepsy; 6) positive status for human immunodeficiency virus or
acquired immune deficiency syndrome; 7) admission to hospice care in accordance with rules
promulgated by the department; or 8) any other medical condition, medical treatment, or disease as
approved by the DOH which results in suffering, or debility for which there is credible evidence that
medical use cannabis could be of benefit including “severe pain.” Subparagraphs (1)-(8) of Subsection
N of 7.34.3.7 N.M. ADMIN. CODE.
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and caregivers (medical cannabis growers) are not to be subjected to arrest or any
other criminal penalty for the possession or cultivation of cannabis that does not
exceed an adequate supply228 under the act.229
The Compassionate Use Act confers on DOH and the cannabis advisory
board (established by the Secretary of DOH) with the responsibility of
administering the state’s medical cannabis program.230 The administrative
framework built around the state’s medical cannabis program focuses on three
areas of regulation. First, the regulations establish the cannabis advisory board’s
responsibilities, which include the duty to: review proposed changes in cannabis
regulations by individuals and organizations; conduct public hearings; and make
recommendations to DOH on rule changes.231 Second, the regulations govern
patient registration and rule compliance and enforcement,232 including:
administration of the process for obtaining a medical cannabis card, regulation of
quantities and uses of cannabis sold to patients and cultivated by caregivers, as well
as disciplinary action for rule violations and the appeal process.233 Third, the
regulations set licensing requirements for cannabis producers, couriers and
manufactures, and laboratories.234
The number of bills introduced in the New Mexico Legislature
undertaking to either change, expand the scope of the state’s medical cannabis
program, or to legalize and tax recreational cannabis in the state have risen.235

227. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2b-2 (2007).
228. 7.34.3.9(A) N.M. ADMIN. CODE. “Adequate supply” means an amount of cannabis, derived
solely from an intrastate source and in a form approved by the department, that is possessed by a
qualified patient or collectively possessed by a qualified patient and the qualified patient’s primary
caregiver, that is determined by the department to be no more than reasonably necessary to ensure the
uninterrupted availability of cannabis for a period of three months or 90 consecutive calendar days,” i.e.
230 grams). Id.
229. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2b-4(A)–(B), (D), (F) (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(E) (2011)
(criminal liability does not attach to “to the use of marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols or chemical
derivatives of tetrahydrocannabinol by certified patients pursuant to the Controlled Substances
Therapeutic Research Act or by qualified patients pursuant to the provisions of the Lynn and Erin
Compassionate Use Act”).
230. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2b-6 (2007).
231. 7.34.2 N.M. ADMIN. CODE.
232. 7.34.3.2-7.34.3.3 N.M. ADMIN. CODE.
233. 7.34.3.9-7.34.3.10, 7.34.3.16 N.M. ADMIN. CODE.
234. 7.34.4 N.M. ADMIN. CODE.
235. See, e.g., H.B. 102, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Marijuana Tax Act); H.B. 334, 53rd Leg.,
1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Local Approval of Medical Marijuana Locations); S.B. 8, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess.
(N.M. 2017) (Medical Marijuana Changes); S.B. 177, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Medical
Marijuana Changes); S.B. 258, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Decrease Marijuana Penalties); H.B.
378, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Medical Marijuana Changes); H.B. 89, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess.
(N.M. 2017) (Cannabis Revenue & Freedom Act); H.B. 155, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Medical
Cannabis Research); H.B. 351, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Define & Schedule Cannabidiol); S.B.
278, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Cannabis Revenue & Freedom Act); S.B. 365, 53rd Leg., 1st
Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Define & Schedule Cannabidiol); S.B. 6, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Research
on Industrial Hemp); see also Tom Angell, New Mexico Weighs Legal Marijuana in Special Session,
MARIJUANA.COM (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.marijuana.com/blog/news/2016/09/new-mexico-weighslegal-marijuana-in-special-session/; Jason Barker, New Mexico Hopeful for Hemp in 2017, WEED NEWS
(Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.weednews.co/new-mexico-hopeful-for-hemp-in-2017/; Jason Barker, New

112

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 58

Following this trend, New Mexico State Representative Derrick J. Lente and
Senator Benny Shendo, Jr. introduced companion bills—HB 348 and SB 345— in
the first regular session of the 2017 New Mexico Legislature aimed at opening the
door for tribes within the state to establish medical cannabis programs on tribal
lands by creating new rights for tribes under the Compassionate Use Act.236
These bills provide that DOH “shall237 enter into an intergovernmental
agreement with any sovereign Indian nation, tribe, or pueblo located in New
Mexico that elects to implement the provisions of the medical cannabis program”
established under the Compassionate Use Act.238 These intergovernmental
agreements239 (or compacts) shall provide for any assistance requested by tribes
concerning implementation of the state’s medical cannabis program on their
lands.240 The state is also required to provide tribes with guidelines for compliance
with their agreements with the state and with the DOH regulations.241
The New Mexico Legislative and Finance Committee’s (NMLFC) fiscal
impact report for SB 345 takes the position that while the bill “serves to incentivize
production of cannabis on tribal land within New Mexico,” it lacks regulatory
direction.242
HB 348 was referred to the House State Government, Indian & Veteran
Affairs Committee and House Judiciary Committee, but did not receive a hearing
before the closing of the legislative session on March 15, 2017.243

Mexico’s 2017 Cannabis Conundrum, WEED NEWS (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.weednews.co/newmexicos-2017-cannabis-conundrum/; Is This The Next State To Legalize Marijuana? State Lawmakers
Hope So, CANNABIST (Jan. 26, 2017, 6:38 AM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/01/26/marijuanalegalization-lawmakers-bill/72223/ (discussing prospects of legalizing and taxing recreational cannabis
in New Mexico).
236. H.B. 348, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Medical Marijuana Tribal Agreements),
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/17%20Regular/bills/house/HB0348.pdf; S.B. 345, 53rd Leg. 1st
Sess. (N.M. 2017) (Medical Marijuana Tribal Agreements), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/17%20
Regular/bills/senate/SB0345.pdf.
237. Amended from “shall” to “may” by Senate Public Affairs Committee on motion by Senator
Craig W. Brandt, R-Rio Rancho, i.e. the “Brandt Amendment.” S. Rep. No. 53-SB0345IC1.wpd, at 1,
(N.M. Feb. 24, 2017) (S. Pub. Affairs Comm.) [hereinafter “SPAC Report”], https://www.nmlegis.gov
/Sessions/17%20Regular/bills/senate/SB0345PA1.pdf; Medical Tribal Agreements: Hearing on S.B.
345 Before the S. Pub. Affairs Comm., N.M. LEGISLATURE (Feb. 24, 2017), http://sg001-harmony.sliq.
net/00293/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20170224/-1/32388#info_.
238. H.B. 348 (N.M. 2017); S.B. 345 (N.M. 2017).
239. See NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, STATE-TRIBAL CONSULTATION, COLLABORATION
AND COMMUNICATION POLICY 1 (https://nmhealth.org/publication/view/regulation/847/) (last visited
Sept. 28, 2017) (Negotiations toward these agreements would likely be guided by the New Mexico
Health and Human Services Departments); see also Statewide Adoption of Pilot Tribal Consultation
Plans, Executive Order No. 2005-004 (N.M. 2005), http://www.indianz.com/docs/richardsoneo2.pdf
(State-Tribal Consultation Protocol, created in response to former Governor Bill Richardson’s 2003
executive order providing state agencies were required to implement protocols for conducting
government-to-government consultation with Indian nations, tribes and pueblos).
240. H.B. 348 (N.M. 2017); S.B. 345(N.M. 2017).
241. Id.
242. N.M. LEG. FIN. COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT FOR S.B. 345: MEDICAL MARIJUANA TRIBAL
AGREEMENTS 1–2 (2017), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/17%20Regular/firs/SB0345.PDF.
243. 2017 Regular Session - HB 348, N.M. LEGISLATURE, https://www.nmlegis.gov/Legislation/
Legislation?chamber=H&legType=B&legNo=348&year=17 (last visited Sept. 4, 2017).
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SB 345, in contrast, received thorough debate in the Senate Indian &
Cultural Affairs Committee (SICAC) and Senate Public Affairs Committee
(SPAC). In SICAC, Senator William Sharer, R-Farmington, argued in opposition
to the bill that opening the door to cannabis in Indian Country would inevitably
lead to New Mexico turning into “the Afghanistan of America,” where drugs and
violence will be New Mexican children’s only opportunities.244 Senator Sharer
urged the tribes to “find some better way to go”245 than SB 345 and work to
introduce “vibrant” programs into Indian Country like “grow[ing] 2x4’s,” i.e., the
logging industry.246 In support of the bill, Senator Benny Shendo, Jr., D-Jemez
Pueblo, and his expert witness, attorney Anthony J. Trujillo of the Gallagher &
Kennedy law firm, argued that the effect of SB 345 would merely be to permit the
tribes to become “compliant with state [cannabis] law” and to provide certainty
with regard to how the tribes may participate in the New Mexico medical cannabis
program via intergovernmental agreements reached with the state.247 SB 345 passed
SICAC by a 4-1 vote.248 In SPAC, SB 345 received the strong support of the
medical cannabis lobby and tribal stakeholders including: Robert Romero, Ultra
Health (an AZ/NM-based cannabis grower and seller); Craig Quanchello, Governor
of the Pueblo of Picuris; and James Naranjo, Lt. Governor of the Pueblo of Santa
Clara.249 SB 345 passed SPAC in a bipartisan 7-0 vote.250 But despite SB 345’s
momentum through its committee assignments, the bill was withdrawn from the
senate floor calendar and referred to a third committee, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, where the bill did not receive a hearing and died at the close of the
legislative session.251
But, even assuming SB 345 or HB 348 would have passed in both houses
of the New Mexico Legislature, such a bill would have likely been vetoed by
Republican Governor Susana Martinez who has historically cited the apparent
conflict between state and federal law that would arise if New Mexico legalized
cultivation and sale of cannabis in the state as her administration’s reason for not
244. Medical Tribal Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 345 before the S. Indian and Cultural Affairs
Comm., 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. at 9:32:35 AM–9:32:55 AM (N.M. Feb. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen.
William Sharer, Member S. Comm. Indian & Cultural Affairs), http://sg001-harmony.sliq.net/00293/
Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20170214/-1/32184.
245. Id. at 9:32:56 AM–9:33:03 AM.
246. Id. at 9:29:25 AM–9:30:10 AM.
247. Id. at 9:33:43 AM–9:34:11 AM (statement of Sen. Benny Shendo, Jr., Member, S. Comm.
Indian & Cultural Affairs); Id. at 9:38:55 AM–9:40:35 AM (statement of Antonio J. Trujillo, Expert
Witness, S. Comm. Indian & Cultural Affairs).
248. S. REP. NO. SB 345IC1.WPD, at 1 (N.M. Feb. 14, 2017)[hereinafter SICAC Report], https://
www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/17%20Regular/bills/senate/SB0345IC1.pdf. (Senator Sharer was the lone
dissenting vote on the bill.)
249. Medical Tribal Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 345 Before the S. Pub. Affairs Comm., supra note
237, at 2:50:48 PM–2:54:00 PM (public comment from: Robert Romero, Ultra Health, Craig
Quanchello, Governor of the Pueblo of Picuris, and James Naranjo, Lt. Governor of the Pueblo of Santa
Clara, S. Comm. Pub. Affairs).
250. SPAC Report, supra note 237, at 1.
251. See 2017 Regular Session—SB 345, N.M. LEGISLATURE (last visited Sept. 4, 2017), https://
www.nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legislation?chamber=S&legType=B&legNo=345&year=17.aSenator
Shendo and Representative Lente were contacted for comment on the future of tribal cannabis in New
Mexico but could not be reached for interviews.
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supporting legalization in New Mexico.252 As a result, unless the Martinez
administration is persuaded to change its position on cannabis because of the
economic and medical potential of the plant253 or until a governor open to exploring
the prospects presented by cannabis is elected,254 a tribal medical cannabis law is
likely to be delayed.255
But all is not lost for tribal cannabis in New Mexico. The current political
environment affords New Mexico lawmakers with the opportunity to continue to
debate and draft cannabis compacting legislation tailored to the unique needs of the
state and the tribes. Toward that end, this article now turns to recommendations for
future state-tribal cannabis compacting legislation in New Mexico.256
252. Matthew Reichbach, Martinez Vetoes Bill to Allow Hemp Research, N.M. POLITICAL REPORT
(Apr. 10, 2015) , http://nmpoliticalreport.com/2953/martinez-vetoes-bill-to-allow-hemp-research/.
253. See O’DONNEL ECONOMICS & STRATEGY, LEGALIZATION OF CANNABIS FOR SOCIAL USE: A
NEW MEXICO MARKET ANALYSIS 2 (2016) (projecting NM legalizing recreational marijuana would
raise $412 million in revenue in one year—more than three times the state’s annual revenue from its
pecan crop), https://www.newcannabisventures.com/wp-content/uploads/Legalization-of-Cannabis-forSocial-Use-New-Mexico-Market-Analysis-09-2016.pdf; Marissa Higdon, New Report Predicts High
Dollars if NM Legalizes Marijuana, ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (Sept. 21, 2017),
http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/news/2016/09/21/report-predict-high-dollars-nm-legalizemarijuana.html. See generally George R. Greer et. al, PTSD Symptoms Reports of Patients Evaluated for
the New Mexico Medical Cannabis Program, 46 J. OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 73 (2014); S.D.
McAllister et. al, Pathways Mediating the Effects of Cannabidiol on the Reduction of Breast Cancer
Cell Proliferation, Invasion, and Metastasis, 129 BREAST CANCER RES. & TREATMENT 37 (2011); M.A.
Ware et. al, Cannabis Use for Chronic Non-Cancer Pain: Results of a Prospective Survey, 102 PAIN
211 (2003).
254. See generally Aaron Cantú, Looking Ahead: Gubernatorial Candidates On NM’s Cannabis
Future, SANTA FE REP. (May 24, 2017), http://www.sfreporter.com/santafe/article-13457-lookingahead-gubernatorial-candidates-on-nm%E2%80%99s-cannabis-future.html.
255. This delay is evident in the lack of a tribal medical cannabis bill being introduced in either the
2017 special session of the New Mexico Legislature or the first legislative session of 2018 as of January
22, 2018.
256. But before moving on, it is worth noting and analyzing the 2017 agreement closed between the
Acoma Pueblo of New Mexico and Bright Green Group of Companies (Bright Green) for the
establishment of a $160 million and 150-acre green house and research facility for the development of
medicinal plant oil extracts, including cannabis, on tribal lands for the next twenty-five years. Susana M.
Bryan, The Largest Medical Marijuana Grow Up in U.S., Nearly 6 Million Square Feet, Breaks Ground
In New Mexico, CANNABIST (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:19 AM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/02/28/
commercial-marijuana-cultivation-new-mexico/74507/; Rachel Sapin, Large Medical Greenhouse on
NM Tribal Land Slated to Create Over 1,200 jobs, ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (Jan. 19 2017), http://
www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/news/2017/01/19/large-medical-greenhouse-on-nm-tribal-landslated.html. Although it appears from the drastic simplification of the company’s website and URL
name-change, compare BRIGHT GREEN GROUP OF COMPANIES, http://www.bright.green/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2018), with BRIGHT GREEN GROUP OF COMPANIES, http://www.brightgreengroup.com/ [https://
web.archive.org/web/20170202113540/http://www.brightgreengroup.com/](archived Feb. 2, 2017), that
the recent developments in federal cannabis enforcement may have chilled the momentum behind the
Acoma Pueblo-Bright Green cannabis development project, the company and Pueblo’s agreement
illustrates a prime example of the kind of tribal grow operating in the grey area of cannabis regulation
that is likely to garner state and federal law enforcement attention, and which New Mexico tribal leaders
should avoid establishing on their lands.
The Delaware-based Bright Green was funded by 125 international investors, primarily Chinese, who
purchased shares in quantities of $800,000 per investor in the company. Bright Green had attracted
international investment largely through its touting of the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Service’s (USCIS) EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, under which entrepreneurs are provided a route
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to acquiring a green card by investing in a U.S.-based business venture at least $500,000 with a plan to
create at least ten jobs in the United States. Marie C. Baca, Acoma, Company Announce Massive
Greenhouse Operation, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.abqjournal.com/861776/acomacompany-announce-massive-operation.html. The operation would have included a 118-acre fully
automated greenhouse, a 900,000-square-foot manufacturing warehouse, a 96,000-square foot research
center, and a 12-megawatt power generation system. Sapin, supra. The construction of the Bright Green
facilities was forecasted to create over 1,200 jobs and employ about 250 people to tend plants, conduct
research, and develop products. Id. Bright Green also actively accepted resumes from the public for
employment opportunities in its facilities. Id.; Employment, BRIGHT GREEN GROUP OF CO.’S (last
visited Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.brightgreengroup.com/. And, although not explicitly stated on its
website, there is no indication that sale of Bright Green’s medicinal cannabis oils would have been be
limited to within the tribe. See id. Rather, based on the size of the operation, personnel, and mission to
provide customers with the purest and most consistent plant oil extracts in the industry, all indications
were that Bright Green’s commercial ambitions are likely national or worldwide. And even though
Bright Green was expected to be able to produce four times as much cannabis as is cultivated through
New Mexico’s entire medical cannabis program, the joint venture did not plan on pursuing a license
from the state to grow in compliance with New Mexico’s medical cannabis laws and regulations. Bryan,
supra.
Applying the Wilkinson Memo, conclusions drawn from the case law concerning the central Indian
cannabis law issues, and Sessions’ deterrence-based marijuana enforcement policy, leads to the
following analysis. First, pursuant to the Wilkinson Memo, a large cannabis grow in a 118-acre
greenhouse, the extracts from which are being sold in interstate and potentially international commerce
is likely to trigger the federal prosecutorial priority of “preventing the diversion of marijuana from states
where it is legal under state law in some forms to other states.” Second, under United States v. Langford,
641 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2011), and People v. Collins, 826 N.W.2d 175 (Mich. App. 2012), of the
company’s projected 250 employees and management-level officers, all non-Indians will fall within the
criminal jurisdiction and police power of the State of New Mexico for all activities and business in
violation of the state’s cannabis laws under the theory such activities are victimless crimes.
Additionally, because recreational and commercial cannabis operations are still unlawful and
unregulated in New Mexico, the civil/regulatory test of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202 (1987), will provide no protection to the Acoma-Bright Green joint venture from the
state’s assertion of its criminal/prohibitory laws on Pueblo lands insofar as the company’s cannabis
enterprise will not fall under the umbrella of a medical cannabis program similar to the state’s program
through DOH. Third, assuming the state permits the Acoma-Bright Green joint venture to operate, the
state’s interest in regulating products being sold in and transported through and from New Mexico is
likely sufficient to permit it to levy taxes on the enterprise’s transactions under Coleville. Fourth, and in
the event litigation arises against the Acoma Pueblo or Bright Green by a state or the federal
government based on their conduct concerning their medicinal plant oil extraction enterprise, because
certain officers and shareholders of the joint venture are non-Indian, the company is not wholly owned
by the Pueblo, precluding the company from being able to claim sovereign immunity as a defense to a
civil suit under Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014). And its contracts with
private third parties may be found void as a matter of public policy should courts follow the court’s
approach in Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, Nos. CV 2011-051310, CV 2011-051311 (Ariz. Super.
Ct. Apr. 17, 2012), 2012 WL 12874349. Finally, based on the Acoma Pueblo-Bright Green venture’s
stated plan to neither pursue permission from the state of New Mexico to conduct its massive cannabis
grow nor comply with established New Mexico medical cannabis laws and regulations, the operation
would likely be a large target for a federal enforcement to deter tribes from establishing cannabis
programs or businesses that go beyond the scope of state law. Considered together, the Acoma-Bright
Green joint venture presents a very high risk to the Pueblo and Delaware company of being: raided by
federal or state police authorities, taxed heavily by the state of New Mexico, vulnerable to civil liability,
and having its contracts found to violate public policy.
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IV. Recommendations for Tribal Cannabis Legislation and Compacts in New
Mexico257
While the 2017 tribal medical cannabis bills demonstrate legislative intent
to open the door in New Mexico to cannabis on tribal lands, the bills contain legal
vulnerabilities that could lead to regulatory uncertainty and litigation. Part IV
proceeds in two parts. First, it will describe the areas ripe for improvement in the
2017 New Mexico tribal medical cannabis bills and argue that the bills, if passed as
drafted, may not have been effective in application. Second, it will provide
cannabis compacting legislation and cannabis compact drafting recommendations.
Moreover, it will argue that, in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of the 2017 New
Mexico tribal medical cannabis bills, a bill and compact terms reflecting this
guidance should be introduced in a future New Mexico legislative session and
drawn upon in negotiations with tribes once the law has passed.
A. New Mexico HB 348 & SB 345: Constructive but Imperfect Bills
There are four potential vulnerabilities drafted into the 2017 New Mexico
tribal medical cannabis bills. First, the language of the bills fails to provide the state
of New Mexico with adequate authority to negotiate with tribes for the
establishment of autonomous and well-regulated cannabis programs on tribal lands
structured around the needs of individual tribes. The bills provide DOH with the
authority to cooperate with tribes for the establishment of tribal cannabis programs,
but limit the state’s authority to enter into “intergovernmental agreement[s]” with
tribes “that elect[] to implement the provisions of the medical cannabis program
established pursuant to” the Compassionate Use Act. This implies that DOH’s role
in the execution of the state’s obligations under the bills would have been restricted
to permitting tribes to opt into the state’s established medical cannabis regime,
under which the state would have been the primary regulator of cannabis on tribal
lands. Consequently, the bills are also drafted too narrowly to permit DOH to bind
the state to tribes’ proposals to establish tribal government cannabis regulatory
regimes that operate independent of the state’s program and oversight.
Second, it is unclear that DOH, alone, is the proper representative from
the New Mexico executive branch to be charged with negotiating transboundary
cannabis programs that have federal, state, and tribal law implications. DOH’s
specialization in cannabis law and policy is limited to the three areas of regulation
that DOH focuses on under the Compassionate Use Act, i.e., rulemaking, patient
and caregiver registration and rule enforcement, and cannabis cultivation licensure.
It is ill-equipped to negotiate transboundary agreements, which, on a tribe-by-tribe
257. See generally SUSAN JOHNSON & JEANNE KAUFMANN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES AND
TRIBES (2009), http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/tribal-governance/state-tribal-relations/Govt_to_
Govt_Models_of_Cooperation_Between_States_and_Tribes_2002.pdf; SUSAN JOHNSON & JEANNE
KAUFMAN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT:
UNDERSTANDING STATE AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS (2000), http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/tribalgovernance/state-tribal-relations/Govt_to_Govt_Understanding_State_and_Tribal_Governments_2000.
pdf; COMMISSION ON STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS, AM. INDIAN LAW CENTER, INC., HANDBOOK: STATETRIBAL
RELATIONS,
http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=
ailc_pubs (providing government-to-government negotiation guidance between states and tribes).
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basis, will have to address questions including whether or to what extent the state
will have criminal jurisdiction or civil/regulatory authority on tribal lands, or how
to structure tribal cannabis enterprises to minimize both the tribes’ and the state’s
potential exposure to federal enforcement by the Trump administration and
Sessions DOJ.
Third, and as observed by NMLFC, the bills suffer from a lack of
regulatory direction. The bills mandate that state-tribal medical cannabis
agreements shall provide for: “any assistance from the department [of health] that
an Indian nation, tribe or pueblo may request in implementing its own medical
cannabis program” on tribal lands. The bills also require the state to provide tribes
opting into medical cannabis with “guidelines for compliance with department [of
health] rules or compliance with separate express provisions of the
intergovernmental agreement” governing cannabis on tribal lands. However, it is
still unclear what assistance to tribes is contemplated by this language and what
form and structure tribally-implemented medical cannabis programs are expected
to take.258 This is problematic because there is no indication in the bills that tribes
would have any policymaking authority to tailor their medical cannabis programs
to the particularized needs of their communities.
Finally, under the Compassionate Use Act and New Mexico
Administrative Code (incorporated into the New Mexico tribal cannabis bills by
reference), there are also no apparent answers to the following critical questions: 1)
Will tribal governments be able to establish a medical cannabis administrative
office or advisory board to provide regulatory recommendations to the state? 2)
Will tribes play any role in reviewing and granting applications to tribal members
for medical cannabis cards and licenses to cultivate cannabis on tribal lands? 3) If
not, will fees for applying for a cannabis card or license to cultivate be paid to the
state or will such revenue go to the tribal governments? 4) Will state police and
code enforcement officers or tribal police have the authority to enforce cannabis
laws and regulations on tribal lands?
As a result of these four legal vulnerabilities in the 2017 New Mexico
tribal medical cannabis bills, moving forward, New Mexico legislators should
consider alternative approaches to drafting tribal medical cannabis legislation.
B. New Mexico Tribal Cannabis Legislative and Compact-Drafting
Recommendations
Effectively approaching the task of drafting future New Mexico tribal
medical cannabis compacting legislation and negotiation of intergovernmental
258. It should be noted that a reasonable reading of this language implies that by entering into an
agreement with the state to establish a medical cannabis program, Tribes submit to the authority of DOH
to regulate the program on Tribal lands—an implication likely unwelcome by many tribal governments.
In particular, DOH regulation of cannabis on tribal lands could colorably implicate Cabazon, 480 U.S.
at 218–22, which, as previously noted, has been used to support the proposition that states generally lack
civil/regulatory authority over Indian tribes on tribal lands. See id. at 208–09; Montour, supra note 127,
at 229–31. As a result, in a dispute over whether tribes or the state has jurisdiction to enforce cannabis
regulations on tribal lands under the New Mexico tribal medical cannabis bills, it is uncertain whether a
court, state or federal, would void a state-tribal intergovernmental agreement to permit the state to
regulate on tribal lands on its face under Hammer, 2012 WL 12874349, apply Cabazon to determine the
validity of such regulation on tribal lands, or adopt a novel approach.

118

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 58

cannabis agreements begins from a synthesis of the CSA and DOJ policy, the 2017
New Mexico medical tribal cannabis legislation, the state of Washington and
Nevada’s tribal cannabis compacting laws, compacts, and Indian cannabis case law
issues. The following discussion is a distillation of this approach.
1. Cannabis Compacting Legislation-Drafting Guidance
There are three key features of effective cannabis compacting legislation
that New Mexico legislators should draft into future tribal medical cannabis bills.
The first is a broad delegation of authority to representatives of the state with the
requisite expertise to negotiate with tribes in the domain of cannabis on a
government-to-government basis. An effective bill would confer on the governor of
New Mexico the broad authority to negotiate or appoint a team of representatives
to negotiate with tribal officials for the establishment of tribal medical cannabis
programs. In particular, including input from DOH, the Office of the Attorney
General, Office of the Governor, and Office of Indian Affairs would go far towards
ensuring that the representatives at the negotiation table are those in the best
position to resolve the substantive issues likely to arise in the formation of an
intergovernmental cannabis agreement (state criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country, tribal sovereign immunity, state taxation on tribal lands, and state-tribal
dispute resolution).
Second, an effective bill should be open-ended and not constrain the
issues on the table for negotiation in the formation of state-tribal medical cannabis
compacts. For example, instead of compacting language presupposing that the
tribes must opt into the New Mexico medical cannabis program to establish a tribal
program, a more effective bill would leave open the issues of: how any particular
tribal medical cannabis program must be structured; under what authority it must
be administered; and under what circumstances the state or tribe may walk away
from a particular agreement and renegotiate. These policies are both consistent with
the “Brandt Amendment,” which amended SB 345 to provide DOH “may” (not
“shall”) enter into intergovernmental agreements with tribes to establish medical
cannabis programs, and also leaves open the opportunity for the state and tribes to
explore, at arm’s length, the complex legal and political issues attendant to entry
into the cannabis arena. Issues like whether it may be a de facto tax on tribes to
require tribal medical cannabis patients or caregivers to pay licensing or
registration fees to the state in order to benefit from a tribal medical cannabis
program, or whether or to what extent the tribes have the sovereign authority to
exclude state regulators from tribal medical cannabis enterprises governed by tribal
ordinances consistent with New Mexico medical cannabis laws.
Third, language should be incorporated that demonstrates clear legislative
intent to emphasize cooperation and negotiation for the mutual benefit of the state
and tribes. Mutual values held by the state and tribes are likely to include:
enhancement of state and tribal public health and safety, well-regulated cannabis
markets, and economic development.
With the design for a model New Mexico tribal medical cannabis bill
sketched, this discussion now turns to recommendations for the drafting of
effective state-tribal cannabis compact terms based on the legislative drafting
guidance proposed above.
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2. Cannabis Compact-Drafting Recommendations259
These compact drafting recommendations proceed from two general
assumptions. First, tribes will generally favor medical cannabis compact terms
maximizing reservation of their authority to regulate conduct that occurs on tribal
lands, but that also operates to cultivate a strong cooperative relationship with the
state in the field of cannabis. Second, an effectively drafted state-tribal cannabis
compact will contain terms equitably addressing the four central Indian cannabis
law issues (criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, state taxation on tribal lands,
tribal sovereign immunity, and state-tribal dispute resolution).
Concerning state criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands, a term should be
incorporated in any state-tribal cannabis compact providing that tribal police and
tribal authorities are vested with ensuring compliance with the tribe’s cannabis
laws and regulations. However, a term providing for state inspections of tribal
cannabis enterprises should also be negotiated to serve as a reasonable check on the
tribal cannabis regulatory system and to promote the general public welfare of the
state. An equitable term would provide that: 1) the state shall be permitted to
inspect tribal cannabis enterprises upon “reasonable notice”; 2) tribal police may be
involved in the inspections; and 3) the results of the state’s inspections are timely
provided to the tribe. In a cooperative, co-regulatory system, under which the tribes
have primary authority over regulation of cannabis on their lands with state
inspections serving as a check, circumstances triggering the federal law
enforcement priorities outlined in the Wilkinson Memo and Cole II Priorities are
likely to be avoided.
Concerning the issue of state taxation of medical cannabis on tribal lands,
a term should be incorporated explicitly providing that the state may not levy any
tax, fee, assessment, or other charge to be assessed against or collected from the
tribe, tribal cannabis enterprise, or tribal member patients related to any activity
involving the production, processing, sale, and possession of medical cannabis
products. However, it would be prudent for the tribes to provide in their compacts
that they agree to collect and use proceeds from fees for medical cannabis card
registration and cultivation licensure, as well as fines assessed for rule violations to
support implementation of strong medical cannabis regulatory regimes in tribal
governments.
Concerning tribal sovereign immunity, a clear, express, and unambiguous
provision should be incorporated making clear and unequivocal each tribe’s intent
to reserve its sovereign immunity in all aspects of its agreement with the state, and
that no term in the compact should be interpreted to imply a waiver of a tribe’s
sovereign immunity.
Finally, concerning dispute resolution, an effective provision will
anticipate the reality of judicial litigation, but also employ a multi-step non-judicial
process aimed at avoiding that result in the event of disputes arising under the
compact. To address the reality of judicial litigation, an equitable choice of law,

259. Joel H. Mack, Cooperative Agreements: Government-To-Government Relations to Foster
Reservation Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1295, 1329-32 (1993) (discussing terms, such as
severability, waiver of sovereign immunity, and remedies in the event of default, typically considered by
the parties in negotiating state-tribe agreements).
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forum selection, venue, and limited waiver of sovereign immunity clause should be
negotiated. Based on the state and tribes’ mutual interest in avoiding application of
federal law and federal courts’ interpretation of state cannabis laws and state-tribal
cannabis compacts, as well as litigating in a community with ties to the parties, a
state court forum located in the judicial district in which the tribal cannabis
enterprise at issue lies is a logical and generally equitable choice for forum and
venue selection. It also follows from the above-mentioned interests of states and
tribes that any such litigation should be governed by the law of the state and tribe
that are parties to the compact. The state and tribe(s) that are parties to the compact,
in addition, should agree in this clause to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
This waiver should be limited to matters involving declaratory and injunctive relief
concerning the subject-matter of the state-tribal cannabis compact, in which
proceeding each party agrees to bear the cost of their own attorneys’ fees and costs.
To establish an effective non-judicial dispute resolution process, notice and face-toface negotiation stand out as a natural starting point for dispute resolution
procedures, and mediation and binding arbitration can provide alternative
mechanisms in the event that negotiation fails. Additionally, language should be
included providing that the state and tribes agree to defend their authority to enter
into and execute the terms of their cannabis compacts in the context of suits
brought by third parties, including the federal government.
Applying these legislative and compacting recommendations, New
Mexico state legislators and tribal leaders can fashion a tribal medical cannabis
compacting bill that lays the foundation for strong state-tribal cooperative
relationships and medical cannabis compacts. The remainder of this article is
dedicated to illustrating how the legislative and compacting guidance and
recommendations proposed in Parts I–IV may be translated into a future tribal
cannabis bill and cannabis compact terms that could garner bipartisan state and
tribal support and result in mutual and significant economic benefits for New
Mexico and Indian communities in the state.
V. Model New Mexico Tribal-State Cannabis Legislation and Compact Terms
What follows in Part V is intended to serve as a policy resources for New
Mexico legislators and as a proposal of model legislation and compact terms for the
drafting of a future effective tribal medical cannabis bill and state-tribal cannabis
compacts. A model New Mexico tribal medical cannabis bill is presented first,
followed by model state-tribal cannabis compact terms.
A. Model New Mexico Tribal Medical Cannabis Legislation
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO:
Section 1.
The legislature intends to build upon the government-togovernment relationship between the State of New Mexico and Indian nations,
tribes, and pueblos located in the state by authorizing the governor, or his or her
designee(s), to enter into agreements concerning the regulation of cannabis on
Indian nation, tribal, and pueblo lands. Such agreements may include, but are not
limited to including, provisions pertaining to:
(a) Criminal and civil law enforcement;
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(b) Regulatory issues relating to the possession, delivery, production,
processing or use of medical cannabis in its various forms;
(c) Medical and pharmaceutical research involving cannabis;
(d) The administration of laws relating to taxation;
(e) Any immunity, preemption or conflict of law relating to the
possession, delivery, production, processing, transportation or use of medical
cannabis; and;
(f) The resolution of any disputes between tribal government and this
State, which may include, without limitation, the use of mediation, arbitration, or
other non-judicial processes.
Section 2.
The legislature finds that these agreements will facilitate
and promote a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the state
and the tribes in the domain of cannabis regulation. Such cooperative agreements
shall aspire to enhance public health and safety and ensure a lawful and a wellregulated cannabis sector in this State.
B. Model New Mexico State-Tribal Compact Terms
Safety and Enforcement.
The Tribe shall address safety and enforcement issues in accordance with
tribal law, this Compact, and the internal policies and controls of the tribe or tribal
cannabis enterprise.
1. Premises Checks.
a.
By the Tribe. The Tribal Police Department or authorized agency
may conduct its own premises checks on tribal lands to observe compliance with
tribal law and this Compact and to provide support and education to tribal cannabis
enterprises and staff. The tribe shall also make the results of tribal police premises
checks available to the state upon request.
b.
By the State. The state of New Mexico, through its staff, may
also conduct premises checks at tribal cannabis enterprises. Prior to conducting a
premises check, the state will contact the tribal police to provide reasonable notice
of its intent to conduct a premises check. Except as provided in Section 3, below,
the tribal police shall observe and participate in all premises checks conducted by
the state. The state will share the results of such premises checks with the tribal
police in a timely manner.
2. Compliance Checks-Non-Patients
a.
By the Tribe. The tribe shall conduct compliance checks of tribal
cannabis enterprises using individuals without a medical cannabis card through the
tribal police department or other authorized agency in accordance with tribal law to
ensure compliance with cannabis card requirements.
b.
By the State. The state of New Mexico, through its staff, may
also conduct compliance checks at tribal cannabis enterprises to ensure compliance
with medical cannabis card requirements. Prior to conducting a compliance check,
the state will contact the tribal police to provide reasonable notice of its intent to
conduct a compliance check. The state will share the results of such compliance
checks with the tribal police in a timely manner.
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3. Cooperation. Both parties will cooperate in good faith to undertake all
state-requested checks jointly. The tribal police department will make reasonable
efforts to arrange and conduct all state-requested premises checks within 48 hours
of being provided with written notice of such request by the state. All such notice
shall be sent to the chief of the tribal police department and chief tribal executive.
However, if the tribal police department is unable or unwilling to arrange or
conduct a properly invoked premises check in 96 hours, the state may then perform
the premises check on its own without tribal police. Should either party have any
concerns arising out of a premises or compliance check or the results thereof, the
parties will meet in good faith to discuss any suggested changes to protocols of the
premises and compliance checks or tribal cannabis enterprise operations.
Taxes.
No state tax or fee, assessment, or other charge imposed under the New
Mexico medical cannabis program, pursuant to the Lynn and Erin Compassionate
Use Act, may be assessed against or collected from the tribe, tribal cannabis
enterprise(s), tribal member business, state licensee, or medical cannabis patient
related to any activity related to the cultivation, processing, and possession of
medical cannabis governed by this Compact. Any amounts received by the tribal
government through the process of permitting and licensure of medical cannabis
patients and cultivators shall be used by the tribe to fund enforcement of the tribal
medical cannabis program.
Sovereign Immunity.
The state and tribe agree that, except for the limited purpose of resolving
disputes in accordance with this compact, the signing of this compact by the tribe
does not imply a waiver of sovereign immunity by the tribe or any of its
subdivisions or enterprises and is not intended as a waiver of sovereign immunity
and that any action by the state in regard to cannabis regulation shall be in accord
with this compact.
Dispute Resolution.
1.
Neither the state nor tribe, nor officers or representatives working
on either party’s behalf, may petition any court to enforce this compact unless: a)
the dispute resolution process described in Section 2 has been followed in good
faith to completion without successful resolution, or b) the other party fails to enter
into the dispute resolution process. Any litigation commenced upon exhaustion of
the dispute resolution process described in Section 2 will be governed as follows:
a.
Litigation shall be governed by the laws of New Mexico
and the tribe, and pursued in District Court for the State of New Mexico,
and any court having appellate jurisdiction thereover;
b.
Venue for said litigation shall be in the District Court
for the State of New Mexico in which the tribe sits, and in which
proceeding forum nonconveniens shall not be asserted by either party;
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c.
The parties waive their sovereign immunity from suit,
only in said New Mexico State District Court and any court having
appellate jurisdiction thereover and only for declaratory and injunctive
relief brought by the parties to this Compact. This waiver of sovereign
immunity is limited and does not extend to monetary relief of any kind or
nature whatsoever, including but not limited to any award of attorneys’
fees and costs, which the parties also agree, shall be borne by each party,
respectively.
2.
Should a dispute arise between the parties regarding compliance
with this compact by either party, or by their officers, employees, representatives,
or agents, the parties will attempt to resolve the dispute though the following nonjudicial dispute resolution process:
a.
Notice. Either party may invoke the dispute resolution
process by notifying the other, in writing, of its intent to do so. The notice
must set out the issues in dispute and identify the party’s position on each
issue.
b.
Meet and Confer. The first stage of the process will
include a face-to-face meeting between representatives of the parties to
attempt to resolve the dispute by negotiation. The meeting must be
convened within thirty (30) days after a party’s receipt of the written
notice described in subsection (a). The representatives of each party will
come to the meeting with the authority to settle the dispute. If the dispute
is resolved, the resolution will be memorialized in a writing signed by the
parties.
c.
Mediation. The second stage of the process will be that
if the parties are unable to resolve the dispute within sixty (60) days after a
party’s receipt of written notice under subsection (a) above, the parties
will engage the services of a mutually agreed upon qualified mediator to
assist them in attempting to negotiate the dispute. Costs for the mediator
will be borne equally by the parties. The parties will pursue the mediation
process in good faith until the dispute is resolved or until the mediator
determines that the parties are not able to resolve the dispute. If the
dispute is resolved, the resolution will be memorialized by the mediator in
a writing signed by the parties, which will bind the parties.
d.
Arbitration.
(1)
If a party terminates the dispute resolution
process before completion, or if the mediator determines that the dispute cannot be
resolved in the mediation process, or if the dispute is not resolved within one
hundred and twenty (120) days after the date the mediator is selected, either party
may initiate binding arbitration proceedings under the rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), but AAA need not administer the arbitration. If the
arbitrator determines that a party is in violation of a material provision of this
compact, and such violation is not or cannot be cured within thirty (30) days after
the arbitrator’s decision, then the other party may terminate this compact within
sixty (60) days’ prior written notice.
(2)
The arbitrator shall have no authority to award
monetary damages or issue injunctive or other equitable relief.
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(3)
Each party will bear its own legal costs
incurred under this section. All costs of the arbitrator will be shared equally.
2.
In any action filed by a third party challenging either the tribe’s
or the state’s authority to enter into or enforce this compact, the parties each agree
to support the compact and defend each of their authority to enter into and
implement this compact; provided, however, that this provision does not waive, and
must not be construed as a waiver of, the sovereign immunity of the tribe or any of
its subdivisions or enterprises.
CONCLUSION
The legal and political issues surrounding tribal cultivation, possession,
and use of cannabis in Indian Country form a complex and winding trail. Thus,
tribes considering the prospect of establishing medical or recreational cannabis
programs on their lands must consider strategies for protecting their tribal cannabis
enterprises from federal intervention; guarding against state attempts to enforce
state law or regulations against tribal members or tribal cannabis enterprises; and
establishing tribal cannabis regulatory regimes that are tailored to tribes’ unique
public health and safety concerns. As a result, close state-tribal cooperation is key
for the success of any tribal cannabis program. In New Mexico, Representative
Lente and Senator Shendo’s introduction of HB 348 and SB 345 in the first regular
session of the 2017 New Mexico Legislature constituted a constructive attempt
toward opening the door in New Mexico to state-tribal discussions concerning
medical cannabis on tribal lands. However, the 2017 tribal medical cannabis bills
contained key legal vulnerabilities likely to render them ineffective. As a result, it
will be crucial for New Mexico to pass medical cannabis compacting legislation
drafted with sufficient breadth to permit the state and tribes with latitude to
negotiate medical cannabis compacts, on equal footing, based on the central Indian
cannabis law issues that are likely to arise. It is also of the utmost importance that
the policy underling any state-tribal cannabis compacting legislation reflects the
establishment of cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships concerning
cannabis in an environment where both governments have strong and vested
interests in the long-term prosperity of their medical cannabis programs. As a
result, and to this end, New Mexico legislators should introduce the model New
Mexico tribal cannabis bill proposed in this article, or one that is substantially
similar, which will lay a strong foundation for future state-tribal cannabis
compacting negotiations.

